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1. ABSTRACT
A comprehensive risk-informed methodology for passive safety system design and
performance assessment is presented and demonstrated on the Flexible Conversion Ratio
Reactor (FCRR). First, the methodology provides a framework for risk-informed design
decisions and as an example two design options for a decay heat removal system are
assessed and quantitatively compared. Next, the reliability of the system is assessed by
quantifying the uncertainties related to system performance and propagating these
uncertainties through a response surface using Monte Carlo simulation. Finally, a
sensitivity study is performed to measure the relative effects of each parameter and to
identify ways to maintain, improve, and monitor system performance.
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6. INTRODUCTION
Many advanced reactor designs rely on both traditional defense-in-depth measures (e.g.,
multiple fission product barriers) and new design features such as inherently safe design
characteristics and passive safety systems. Unlike the active systems common in the
current reactor fleet, passive systems do not require external driving forces or operator
actions and are thus considered to be simpler and more reliable. Several classes of
passive safety systems exist. Table 1 lists the four categories of passive safety systems
defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency [1].
A common characteristic of passive safety systems is that their driving force tends to be
weak and therefore adverse or off-normal conditions may substantially degrade system
performance [2]. Under certain conditions, system performance may be degraded to a
level that results in unacceptable consequences. These consequences are typically
identified by the system designer and are referred to as failure criteria. Failure criteria
can be defined at the system level (e.g., flow rate, fluid temperature) or at a higher level
(e.g., peak cladding temperature, containment pressure). Therefore, the conditional
failure probability of a passive system can be defined as the probability that, given an
initiating event, a set of thermal-hydraulic conditions will exist that cause the system to
exceed one or more failure criteria.
Category System Fluid Movement Moving Examples
& Initiation Parts
Description Signal
A. Inherent None None None Physical barriers against the release of
Safety fission products, such as nuclear fuel
Features cladding and pressure boundary systems
B. Fluid None Due only to thermal- None Reactor emergency cooling systems based
system with hydraulic conditions on air or water natural circulation in heat
no moving exchangers immersed in water pools (inside
parts containment) to which the decay heat is
directly transferred
C. Fluid None Due to thermal hydraulic Yes, but Emergency injection systems consisting of
system with conditions and state no external accumulators or storage tanks and discharge
moving change of mechanical energy lines equipped with check valves
parts components (valves, sources
dampers, etc)
D. Active Stored Due to thermal hydraulic Yes, but Emergency reactor shutdown systems based
Initiation/ energy - no conditions and state no external on gravity driven or static pressure driven
Passive AC or change of mechanical energy control rods activated by fail-safe logic
Execution manual components (valves, sources
initiation dampers, etc)
permitted
Table 1 - IAEA Passive Safety System Classification [1]
System conditions leading to failure are the result of adverse combinations of system
parameter values such as pressure, temperature, and void fraction. Prediction of the exact
values of these parameters is made difficult by several sources of uncertainty and
typically, we can only assume a range of expected values and a corresponding probability
distribution. We will refer to this type of uncertainty as parametric uncertainty. Second,
there are uncertainties associated with the models used to predict system behavior. These
can involve equations or empirical correlations used to model various phenomena or may
stem from the numerical methods employed by computer codes. We will refer to this
type of uncertainty as model uncertainty. Both parametric and model uncertainties are
classified as epistemic since they are related to a lack of knowledge as opposed to
aleatory uncertainty, which is related to randomness [3]. An estimate of system
reliability can be obtained by quantifying parametric and model uncertainty and
observing their effect on system performance. Further insights can be gained by
evaluating the sensitivity of system performance to each parameter, and we will
demonstrate several ways in which this can be done.
The reliability of passive safety systems has been the subject of a great deal of research
this decade both in the United States and internationally. System failure is assumed to
occur when a physical quantity such as temperature exceeds a value that is considered
acceptable, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as "functional failure" [4]. A
systematic methodology for the reliability assessment of passive systems is described by
Marques et al in [2].
Past efforts at MIT have been focused on design tradeoffs [5-6]. System reliability is
assessed by performing a large number of simulations using the code RELAP5-3D [7]
coupled with Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS). These simulations cover a range of
thermal hydraulic (T-H) conditions. The probability of system success (reliability) is
estimated simply by dividing the number of simulations that result in success by the total
number of simulations:
- A(i)
Pr(success) = A(i) (1)
N is the total number of simulations and A(i) is a binary variable equal to unity when all
success criteria are met and zero otherwise. A sufficient number of simulations must be
performed to provide confidence in the results.
Mackay et al performed 128 simulations, observed 39 failures, and recommended several
risk-informed design improvements based on these results [5]. Patalano et al
supplemented the Gas-cooled Fast Reactor (GFR) design with these improvements and
added several others. These changes reduced the number of failures to 16 out of 128 [6].
Initially, we considered using this methodology to perform a reliability study of the lead-
cooled, fast spectrum, Flexible Conversion Ratio Reactor (FCRR) under development at
MIT as part of the Department of Energy's Nuclear Energy Research Initiative (NERI).
During the planning phase of this effort, a concern about computational time was
identified.
Both previous efforts at MIT studied the GFR, a direct-cycle design with a relatively
simple RELAP5-3D model. Furthermore, these papers focused on a fast-developing
transient (LOCA) with a coolant (helium) that changes temperature quickly during
transients due to its relatively low specific heat capacity. Consequently, both papers
obtained temperatures exceeding the peak cladding temperature (PCT) and the peak
decay heat removal (DHR) pipe temperature within the first three hours of the transient.
Exceeding either peak temperature is considered a failure.
The FCRR operates at ambient primary pressure and employs a guard vessel, so LOCA is
not a major concern. Instead, Station Blackout (SBO) has been shown to be the most
severe transient in terms of PCT. This is due to the sudden loss of both primary and
secondary forced flow. Analysis of this transient presents a challenge because PCTs are
not observed until more than 60 hours into the SBO event [8]. This is mostly due to the
very large heat capacity of lead, the FCRR primary coolant. Because the primary coolant
can absorb a large amount of energy, it heats up slowly during an SBO and, therefore,
fuel and cladding temperatures rise slowly as well.
In addition to the long duration of the SBO transient, the FCRR RELAP5-3D model is
somewhat more complex than that of the GFR. The FCRR uses a super-critical CO 2 (S-
CO 2) power conversion system rather than the direct-cycle system found in the GFR.
Additionally, the GFR uses a single two-loop decay heat removal (DHR) system. The
FCRR uses two systems to accomplish decay heat removal. The Reactor Vessel
Auxiliary Cooling System (RVACS) is a passive system that provides primary system
cooling via natural convection of air around the reactor vessel. The Passive Secondary
Auxiliary Cooling System (PSACS) is a passive system that removes heat from the
primary system via the intermediate heat exchangers by providing natural circulation of
S-CO 2 fluid to a large tank of water that serves as the ultimate heat sink. These factors
combine to produce a model that takes substantially longer to run than those used in the
GFR studies. A summary of the reactor differences and the required simulation times is
presented in Table 2.
A faster computer was used during the FCRR study, but the long transient time and
additional model complexity still increase the amount of computing time per simulation
by a factor of three to four compared to the GFR studies. Performing a reasonable
number of simulations would still require substantial computing time, a fact that provides
motivation for the use of response surface methodology.
Project Cooling Fluids Computer Transient Time per Number
system time trial of trials
GFR, DHR Helium & Water P4 3.2 GHz; > 3 hours - 8 hrs 128
MacKay et (DHR) 1 GB RAM
al[5]
GFR, DHR Helium & Water P4 3.2 GHz; > 2 hours = 10 hrs 128
Patalano et (DHR) 1 GB RAM
al [6]
FCRR PSACS Lead, S-C0 2, Water P4 Quad 72 hours = 30 hrs
RVACS (PSACS), Air Core 2.6 with 3
(RVACS) GHz, 4 GB simultaneous
RAM runs
P4 3.2 GHz; 72 hours = 36 hrs
1 GB RAM
Table 2 - Comparison of GFR and FCRR
A different approach to passive system reliability assessment, known as the Assessment
of Passive System Reliability (APSRA) methodology, is being proposed by the Bhabha
Atomic Research Centre (BARC). The APSRA focuses on mechanical failures and their
effect on passive system performance [9].
This paper focuses on functional failures of passive systems. First, a model of the system
is constructed using RELAP5-3D. Next, a set of simulations are performed to construct a
response surface that models system performance during an SBO. Finally, the reliability
of the system is assessed by performing a Monte Carlo simulation with the response
surface.
7. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The FCRR is a 2400MWth lead-cooled fast reactor currently under development by
MIT's Nuclear Science and Engineering department as part of the Department of
Energy's Nuclear Energy Research Initiative [8]. The FCRR core can be configured to
support various conversion ratios (CRs), although the analyses were performed only for
two bounding CRs: (1) near zero to transmute legacy waste and (2) near unity to operate
in a sustainable closed cycle. Because this paper focuses on reactor safety, only the more
challenging case of a near unity conversion ratio was investigated due to its higher decay
heat loads. The reactor is coupled to a power conversion system (PCS) consisting of a
Brayton cycle utilizing S-CO 2. The PCS consists of four 600 MWth loops, each
consisting of an in-vessel Intermediate Heat Exchanger (IHX), a turbine, high- and low-
temperature recuperators, a pre-cooler, and two compressors. Diagrams of the primary
and secondary system are displayed in Figures 1 and 2, respectively. Details regarding
the S-CO 2 PCS are given in [9]. Decay heat removal during both normal and emergency
conditions is provided by a pair of passive systems that work in tandem: the RVACS and
PSACS. These systems are represented graphically in Figures 1 and 3 respectively.
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Figure 1 - FCRR Primary System and RVACS [10]
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Figure 2- State Point Diagram of the FCRR Power Conversion System [8]
Figure 1 shows the major primary system components and the RVACS. The reactor
vessel houses the fuel, primary coolant (lead), reactor coolant pumps, and in-vessel heat
exchangers. Surrounding the reactor vessel is the reactor guard vessel which serves as a
defense against coolant leaks. The reactor guard vessel is enveloped by the RVACS,
which provides heat removal via natural convection to air that is drawn through inlet
ducts and flows upward over the reactor guard vessel due to buoyancy effects. Ambient
air outside the containment building is the ultimate heat sink. The RVACS is classified as
an IAEA Category B passive system since it does not require external power, moving
parts, control signals, or operator actions to accomplish its design function. The RVACS
concept was originally developed for the much smaller 1000MWth S-PRISM reactor [12];
therefore, a key design challenge was to increase the heat removal capability to a level
appropriate for the 2400 MWth FCRR.
------------ %26.6. r,
appropriate for the 2400 MWth FCRR.
Design enhancements include the addition of a perforated plate in the air gap, lead-
bismuth eutectic within the gap between the reactor vessel and guard vessel, and the use
of dimples on the guard vessel wall. The use of a perforated plate was first identified by
General Electric during the S-PRISM design, while the addition of a lead-bismuth
eutectic and dimples are design improvements developed by an INL/MIT team for a lead-
alloy cooled medium power reactor. Together, these enhancements have improved
RVACS performance to decay heat removal rates between 15 MWth and 17 MWth under
accident conditions [8].
Although these improvements are noteworthy, transient analyses have shown that this
performance is not sufficient under some accident scenarios such as the bounding
transient, which is SBO. During this accident sequence, the heat removal rate of the
enhanced RVACS would be insufficient to maintain the PCT below the design limit of
725 0C. Consequently, additional decay heat removal options to supplement the enhanced
RVACS were investigated.
Initially, use of the PCS as an emergency decay heat removal system was considered
since this equipment was already available; however, this would require most, if not all,
of the PCS to be classified as safety- related [13]. Within the current regulatory
framework, safety-related components must be seismically qualified to withstand the
Safe Shutdown Earthquake, also known as the Design Basis Earthquake [14], and the
Quality Assurance rules of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B [15] would apply to nearly all PCS
systems and subsystems. The reclassification of nearly the entire PCS as safety related
would lead to a substantial increase in construction, maintenance, and procurement costs.
Therefore, the decision was made to use the PCS as a non-safety related DHR system that
is backed up by a stand-alone safety-grade DHR system.
Several supplemental alternatives for a safety-related DHR system were evaluated:
* A Direct Reactor Auxiliary Cooling System (DRACS) consisting of a separately
designed lead-bismuth eutectic loop connected to an air cooled heat exchanger
located in the chimney of the RVACS riser.
* A Passive Secondary Auxiliary Cooling System (PSACS) that removes decay
heat via the existing lead/S-CO2 IHX and a standby loop filled with secondary S-
C0 2, which transports heat by natural circulation from the IHX to a heat
exchanger cooled passively by either air or water.
The DRACS was discarded because of space constraints in the reactor vessel, and
PSACS was selected for further analysis. Since both the PSACS air and water designs
were deemed to have merit, a formal decision-making process was utilized to complete
the selection process. The Analytic Deliberative Process (ADP) [16] was used to assess
the two design options against a variety of performance measures such as economics,
reliability, and thermal hydraulic performance. Using the ADP, the PSACS-water option
was selected as the final design option and RELAP5-3D simulations were used to test and
optimize the design.
The final PSACS design consists of four independent, 50% capacity each, safety-grade
trains - one for each PCS loop (Figure 3). Each PSACS train is connected to an IHX
loop by two PSACS isolation valves in parallel (B). The train also consists of an inlet
header or "hot leg (A)," a Passive Auxiliary Heat Exchanger (E), PSACS Storage Tank
(D) and a return header to the PCS or "cold leg (F)". The hot and cold legs connect the
PSACS to the PCS and the PSACS Storage Tank (PST). The latter stores a large volume
of water that acts as the ultimate heat sink during PSACS operation (Figure 3).
Figure 3 - One Train of the Passive Secondary Auxiliary Cooling System (PSACS)
The PSACS Auxiliary Heat Exchanger (PAHX) is a vertical bank of parallel tubes
submerged in the PSACS Storage Tank (PST), which is filled with ambient temperature
water. S-CO 2 flow enters the tube bank through a plenum near the top of the PAHX and
travels downward through the tubes, rejecting heat into the water. The bottom of the
PAHX is located 2 meters above the top of the IHX to provide a suitable elevation
difference for natural circtllation. Each PCS loop has a corresponding PSACS train so
failure to isolate a PCS loop during a transient creates a bypass around that train,
compromising natural circulation. To minimize the probability of this occurrence, each
PCS loop contains two PCS isolation valves in series rather than a single valve.
Additionally, the PSACS trains are not interconnected, so a depressurization of one train
will not affect the others. The PSACS is classified as an IAEA Category C passive
system because it relies on thermal hydraulic conditions for fluid flow and contains
isolation valves that change state with no initiation signal [1].
Table 3 - PSACS Design Specifications
The PSACS design specifications listed in Table 3 were selected to allow the PSACS to
suppress PCT below the 725C accident limit during all credible accident scenarios even
with the complete loss of two-out-of-four trains [8]. We selected this scenario for further
analysis because it is the bounding case.
8. FRAMEWORK
8.1 Accident Scenario
An SBO is defined as the complete loss of alternating current (AC) to the essential and
non-essential switchgear buses in a nuclear power plant, i.e., loss of offsite power
concurrent with a turbine trip and loss of emergency onsite power [13]. This is a beyond-
design-basis accident under the present regulations but one that the current fleet of
reactors in the United States must have the capability to manage per 10 CFR 50.63. An
SBO event presents a significant operational challenge as it leads to a loss of forced
primary flow (the reactor coolant pumps rely on AC) and disables several ways of
Tube height 4 meters
Tube outer diameter 1.4 cm
Number of tubes per PAHX 700
Pitch / Diameter 3.5
PST height 10 m
PST diameter 6 m
Nominal PST Water Volume 282 m3
primary and secondary heat removal such as the motor-driven pumps used by the
emergency core cooling system or auxiliary feedwater system.
Passive cooling systems provide a distinct advantage during SBOs because they rely on
natural phenomena rather than AC power to perform their safety functions. The RVACS
and PSACS both provide cooling during this accident using natural circulation and
neither has any components that require AC power to perform their safety-related
functions. We are interested in the conditional failure probability of the RVACS and
PSACS given that an SBO occurs and AC power is not recovered.
When AC power is lost, the reactor coolant pump (RCP) trip breakers are opened,
resulting in a loss of forced circulation of primary coolant. The RCPs slowly coast down
and natural circulation of primary coolant is established due to thermal head. On the
secondary side, the PCS isolation valves fail shut and the PSACS isolation valves fail
open. Each set of isolation valves are held in their normal position by either a solenoid or
instrument air actuator and require AC to remain in their respective positions [Figure 3].
When AC power is lost they swap positions, isolating the PCS and placing the PSACS
into service. Fuel and primary coolant temperature rise slowly due to decay heat and this
heat is transferred to the S-CO2 via the four IHXs. As the S-CO 2 heats up, a density
difference between the PSACS hot leg and cold leg is established and natural circulation
begins. As the PSACS removes heat from the secondary system, a temperature
differential is established across the IHXs. This draws heat out of the primary system and
leads to a reduction in primary coolant temperature and fuel temperature. The reduction
of PCT is displayed in Figure 4.
As the hot S-CO2 rejects heat into the PST, the water heats up, eventually boiling
approximately two hours into the SBO. This phase change temporarily improves heat
transfer, but the PSACS gradually loses effectiveness as inventory is boiled off.
Assuming conservatively no operator intervention, the PSACS will boil dry in about 24
hours and will cease to provide cooling. At this point, primary temperature again begins
to rise due to decay heat.
As the primary coolant temperature rises, the guard vessel heats up and RVACS flow rate
increases due to natural circulation; this slows the temperature rise until a maximum
temperature is reached at about 68 hours.
Figure 4 - PCT During SBO
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8.2 Success Criteria
The deterministic limit for PCT is 725 0 C. This limit does not correspond to prompt fuel
or cladding damage; rather, this temperature leads to the onset of fuel/cladding chemical
interaction. Temperatures higher than 725 0 C can cause actinide diffusion into the
cladding and lead to low-melting-point regions resulting in clad thinning and potential
failure [17]. These conditions have therefore been deemed unacceptable.
Because Gen III+ designs like the AP1000 and ESBWR are capable of mitigating an
SBO for at least 72 hours, this value was chosen as the assumed duration of the event.
Therefore, a successful mission requires the FCRR's DHR systems to maintain PCT
below 7250 C for at least 72 hours during an SBO event. No operator actions are
assumed.
8.3 System Reliability
Unlike the RVACS, which is constantly operating, the PSACS is isolated during normal
operation. There are four 50% capacity trains and several valves must change state
before each train can provide cooling. Therefore, failure of these valves can challenge
PSACS performance by affecting the number of available trains. To quantify the
probability of losing one or more PSACS trains due to valve failure, we constructed a
fault tree of each train. The fault tree captures the system logic and models the effect of
valve reliability on PSACS reliability. In addition, it shows which combinations of valve
failures lead the loss of a PSACS train. These combinations (minimal cut sets) are useful
to the designer because they identify potential weaknesses or single point failures.
These insights were used to support PSACS design and led to several key features. First,
the PSACS inlet and return isolation valves are in parallel so that a single valve failure
does not prevent a PSACS train from actuating. As long as at least one inlet and one
return isolation valve are open, the PSACS train can perform its design function.
Similarly, the PCS inlet and return isolation valves are in a series configuration so that a
single valve failure does not create a bypass around the PSACS train or lead to PSACS
depressurization should a PCS leak occur. These features ensure that no single valve
failure can disable a PSACS train.
Although multiple independent component failures are unlikely, several failures can
occur simultaneously for the same reason. Improper maintenance, installation errors,
design flaws, and adverse environmental factors can all lead to multiple dependent
failures. These failures are known as common cause failures (CCFs) and it is important
to account for them in our PSACS model. To do so, we make use of the Beta Factor
model, which is somewhat conservative but simple and accurate enough for our purposes.
In this model, we assume that a certain fraction of component failures are due to a
common cause and lead to the failure of all identical components in the system. This
fraction, 13, is typically assigned a value of about 0.10 [18]. There are two distinct types
of PSACS and PCS valves: Solenoid Operated Valves (SOVs) and Air-Operated Valves
(AOVs).
Prior to calculating PSACS train reliability, let us examine the minimal cut sets for one
train of PSACS.
Cut Set Failures Basis Mean
No. Probability
1 PSACS Inlet AOV The PSACS train remains isolated and can 9 x 106
and PSACS Inlet not provide any decay heat removal
SOV
2 PSACS Return AOV 9 x 106
and PSACS Return
SOV
3 PCS Inlet AOV and Failure to isolate a PCS loop creates a 9 x 10-6
PCS Inlet SOV flow bypass around the corresponding
4 PCS Return AOV PSACS train. Hot S-CO 2 exiting the IHX 9 x 106
and PCS Return SOV could instead flow through the PCS rather
than the PSACS. Furthermore, PCS
piping is non-safety related and therefore
less robust than the PSACS piping.
Without isolation, a rupture or leak in the
PCS could depressurize the PSACS
thereby challenging its effectiveness.
5 CCF -SOV and Same as 1 & 2 1.5 x 10-
PSACS Inlet AOV
6 CCF -SOV and Same as 1 & 2 1.5 x 10-5
PSACS Return AOV
7 CCF -SOV and PCS Same as 3 & 4 1.5 x 10-
Inlet AOV
8 CCF -SOV and PCS Same as 3 & 4 1.5 x 10-5
Return AOV
9 CCF-AOV and Same as 1 & 2 1.5 x 10-'
PSACS Inlet SOV
10 CCF-AOV and Same as 1 & 2 1.5 x 10-'
PSACS Return SOV
11 CCF-AOV and PCS Same as 3 & 4 1.5 x 10-
Inlet SOV
12 CCF-AOV and PCS Same as 3 & 4 1.5 x 10-
Return SOV
Table 4 - PSACS Minimal Cut Sets
To determine the probability of these cut sets, we use valve reliability data from the
Nuclear Computerized Library for Assessing Reactor Reliability [19]. No specific failure
rates were available for valves in an S-CO 2 environment, so we substituted data from
valves in a liquid sodium environment, which were the most conservative numbers
available. Based on this information, the probability of either valve type failing to
open/close was modeled as a lognormal distribution with a mean value of 3 x 10-3 per
demand and an error factor of 10. The computer code SAPHIRE 7 was used so that these
values, rather than just point estimates, could be incorporated [20]. Using SAPHIRE's
fault tree analysis feature, we calculated the mean probability of losing a single train of
PSACS due to valve failure:
Pr[PSACS train fails on demand] = 1.6 x 10-4
Losing one train of PSACS does not disable the system. In fact, the PSACS is designed
to meet the success criteria discussed in Section 8.2 with up to two trains simultaneously
unavailable. This is accomplished by selecting conservative design values for the PAHX
and PST, which are displayed in Table 3.
We can calculate the probability of two simultaneous PSACS train failures using the
following expression:
Pr[failure of two trains] = Pr[independent failure] + Pr [CCF] (2)
The probability of CCF is determined using the very conservative Beta Factor model,
which assumes that a CCF of one valve type (AOV or SOV) in one PSACS train is
always accompanied by CCF of all valves of that type in the other three trains.
Therefore, if one train experiences CCF, another train is assumed to fail if at least one
valve in the opposite valve group fails. We can now write Equation (2) as:
Pr [failure of two trains] = Pr [independent failure] + Pr[CCF of AOVs] x Pr[at least one
SOV fails] + Pr[CCF of SOVs] x [Pr at least one AOV fails] (3)
Adding the probabilities of minimal cut sets that share basic events, known as the
minimal-cut-set upper bound approximation, is appropriate when the probability of the
top level event is small [20]. Using this approach, the probability of independent failure
for a given train is determined by summing of the probabilities of minimal cut sets 1 - 4
in Table 4 and the probability of CCF can be determined by summing the probabilities of
minimal cut sets 5-12. The probability of at least one AOV or SOV failing in another
train is equal to 0.035. Inserting these numbers into Equation (3), and assuming that Beta
is lognormally distributed with a mean value of 0.10 and an error factor of 3, we find that
the mean probability of simultaneous failure of two PSACS trains is 4.0 x 10-6 and the
95th percentile is 1.4 x 105.
This probability is quite low even with our conservative assumptions and we will
consider the probability of losing more than two trains of PSACS negligible. The overall
system failure probability then becomes:
Pr[failure] = J'= Pr[failure N = i]. Pr[N = i] (4)
where N = the number of operational PSACS trains. In this context, operational means
that a PSACS train is not isolated and the corresponding PCS loop is isolated. Once a
PSACS train is operational, all flow is due to natural circulation and no external energy
sources, mechanical components, or operator actions are needed. Therefore, operational
PSACS trains are subject only to functional failures and can be analyzed by constructing
a model of the system and performing a Monte Carlo simulation in the manner described
in Section 1. Performing this analysis provides values for the first half of Equation (4),
the conditional failure probability given a number of operational trains.
When three or four PSACS trains are operational (i = 3 or 4 in Equation 4), there is a
substantial amount of margin between PCT and the 725 'C failure criterion at all times.
In fact, simulations have shown that even when all input variables are set to their worst
case values, the PSACS can meet the success criteria outlined in Section 8.2 provided
that at least three trains are operational. This indicates that functional failure when at
least three trains are operational is negligible and we should focus our uncertainty
analysis on the case when two trains are available. Therefore, Equation (4) reduces to:
Pr[failure] = Pr[failurelN = 2] * Pr[N = 2] (4a)
The next step is to evaluate this case using a computer model to measure system
performance.
8.4 Simulation Code
A RELAP5-3D model was used to develop steady-state operating parameters for the
FCRR and to ensure that design constraints such as primary coolant flow rate and reactor
vessel size were met. Construction of this model took place in four stages:
1. A model of the primary system was constructed with the core represented as two
subchannels: hot and average.
2. A detailed IHX model was created separately, optimized, and then connected to the
primary system model.
3. The enhanced RVACS with dimples on the guard vessel and perforated plate in the
air riser region was added to the model.
4. The complete S-CO 2 PCS was coupled to the primary system
Figure 5 - RELAP5-3D Nodalization Diagram Showing Two PSACS Trains
In the FCRR RELAP5-3D model, the primary coolant system is characterized by
components 500 through 595. The nodalization starts with the lower plenum, component
500. The flow is subsequently split into two parallel channels: hot channel (component
516) and average channel (component 510). The hot channel represents four lumped
assemblies with the highest peaking factor of 1.21. The average channel represents the
remaining assemblies. The flow is recombined in the chimney, component 520.
Component 540 corresponds to the upper vessel plenum. Four heat exchangers are
represented by components 560 and 561. Component 560 depicted in Figure 5
corresponds to lead-side coolant channels of one heat exchanger. The other three IHXs
are lumped together in component 561. For some transient calculations, lumping was
eliminated to allow for individual loop modeling. The heat exchanger downcomer, vessel
liner, and the pump downcomer are represented by components 570, 580 and 590,
respectively. The flow exits the heat exchangers, flows downward through the IHX
downcomer, then upward behind the liner, and finally returns to the lower vessel plenum
through the pump downcomer. As the coolant passes through the space between the liner
and the vessel, heat transfer between the vessels and RVACS occurs. The position of
valve 585 which directs the flow from the liner to the pump downcomer was selected
based on the pressure drop through the primary system.
Hatched components correspond to the heat structures. Heat structures are connected
thermally to the attached hydrodynamic volumes. The primary system includes five main
structures: average fuel pins, hot fuel pins, core barrel, heat exchanger tubes, and the
reactor vessel liner. The RVACS heat structures include reactor and guard vessels with
lead-bismuth as the conducting fluid, the perforated plate, and the collector cylinder.
The fuel pin model is quite detailed and includes a lead-alloy bond, cladding and an oxide
layer on the outside of cladding. The heat exchanger tube heat structure also includes an
oxide layer on the lead-side. Finally, the C0 2-side of the IHX heat structure includes
tube surface augmentation (helical ribs) to model enhanced heat transfer.
The parameter values generated by the steady-state model were used to supply initial
conditions to the RELAP5-3D transient analysis. This analysis uses the same RELAP5-
3D model displayed in Figure 5, but tracks reactor parameters (e.g. peak clad
temperature) throughout the duration of the transient. In this case, we modeled an SBO
event but the same process can be used to model other transients such as inadvertent rod
withdrawal or loss of primary system flow.
8.5 Methodology Overview
As discussed in Section 1, the methodology used to evaluate the reliability of the PSACS
and RVACS is similar to previous efforts at MIT [5, 6] except that uncertainty analysis is
conducted using a response surface rather than the RELAP5-3D model itself. Response
Surface Methodology (RSM) replaces the output of a best estimate code (in this case,
RELAP5-3D) with a function of the form [21]:
Y = g(X) (5)
Y is an output variable of interest (in our case, PCT) that depends on X a vector of input
parameters also known as factors or predictor variables. Experiments are conducted with
the predictor variables X1, X2, ... , Xn a sufficient number of times to define the response
surface to the level of accuracy desired. In general, experiments may be conducted at a
test facility, but computer simulations are typically used for nuclear applications.
The resulting data can be used to construct a response surface with a variety of forms:
linear, polynomial, thin plate splines, and others. Once formed, the response surface
replaces the slow-running thermal-hydraulic code and is used to model system
performance. Because calculations with the response surface can be performed very
quickly, the problem of long simulation times is circumvented. We have integrated the
use of a response surface into a reliability analysis methodology that consists of the
following steps:
1. Definition of the system, its mission and failure modes.
2. Construction of a system model using RELAP5-3D.
3. Identification of the sources of epistemic uncertainty and the important
parameters, including the definition of specific failure criteria.
4. Quantification of uncertainties by selecting appropriate probability
distributions. Literature searches and expert judgment were used when
appropriate.
5. Determination of central and enveloping values for the parameters, based on
these distributions.
6. Construction of a response surface based on 27 RELAP5-3D simulations and
the PCT values that each predicts.
7. Propagation of parametric uncertainty through the response surface using
Monte Carlo simulations.
8. Determination of passive system reliability.
9. Performance of a model uncertainty sensitivity study.
10. Performance of a parametric sensitivity study.
9. ANALYSIS
9.1 Construction and Validation of Response Surface
Based on expert judgment, literature review, and RELAP5-3D data, five predictor
variables were considered likely to have an appreciable effect on decay heat removal
performance. To account for potential non-linear effects, a quadratic model was selected
and each variable was then assigned a lower, center, and upper level. This was done
because construction of a quadratic response surface requires at least three levels per
factor. The lower and upper levels were selected to envelope all expected values; this is
an important step in creating a response surface that can predict system performance
accurately. Using a response surface with predictor variable values outside of this
envelope requires extrapolation and can reduce accuracy greatly [21]. The predictor
variables and their three levels are displayed in Table 5.
Factor Lower Central Upper
X 1, PSACS plugged tubes (fraction) 0 0.075 0.15
X2, PSACS initial water temperature (oC) 7 27 47
X3, RVACS emissivity (unit-less) 0.65 0.75 0.85
X4 , RVACS blockage (fraction) 0 0.075 0.15
Xs, RVACS inlet temperature (oC) 7 27 47
Table 5 - Predictor Variables and Levels
Twenty-seven combinations of these values were then used to create a response surface
experiment in the manner described by Xu et al [21]. This design allows for a full
quadratic response surface including linear terms, quadratic (squared) terms, and two-
factor interactions. Each set of predictor variables were entered into the RELAP5-3D
model and a simulation was performed to determine the corresponding PCT.
Following the collection of the data from the simulations, we used the statistical program
MINITAB 14 [22] to construct the following response surface:
Y(X) = 711.5 + 4.2X 1 + 2.7X 2 - 9.2X 3 + 1.4X 4 - 15.6X 5 + 4X 12 + 0.5X 22 - 0.5X32
4.3X 42 +3.5X 52 - 2.7X 1X2 -0.4X 1X3 - 4.8XIX 4 + 1.5 XIX 5 - 2.7X 2X3 + 5.9X 2X4 -
0.8X 2X5 - 9.5X 3X4 +.1X 3X5 - 1.7X 4X5  (6)
MINITAB 14 uses a least-mean-squares approach to fit an equation that best fits the data;
however, a number of checks should be performed on any response surface to ensure that
it accurately models the process in question. In our case, we wanted confidence that the
response surface would serve as an appropriate substitute for our RELAP5-3D model of
the Station Blackout event.
The following checks were performed:
1. Coefficient of determination (R2 value). R2 is a value in the interval [0,1] that
expresses what fraction of the output variability can be accounted for by the input
variability. It is more formally defined as:
2 SSRR SS (7)SST
where the variability explained by the regression line, the regression sum of
squares
SSR = (y- ) (8)
i= 1
is divided by the total variability in the dependent variable, the total sum of
squares
n
SST= _(y, Y)2 (9)
t=1
In a "perfect" model, all output variance would be explained simply by input
variance and R2 would equal unity. In reality, models are an approximation and
therefore add a degree of error or variance. An effective model should have a
value of R2 as close to unity as possible.
2. Size and distribution of residuals. Residuals from a fitted model are the
differences between the responses observed at each input variable value and the
corresponding prediction of the response computed using the response surface.
Mathematically:
e, = y-g(x,) (10)
with yi denoting the ith response in the data set and xi representing the vector of
input variables.
If the response surface fits the data well, the residuals should approximate the
random errors that make the relationship between the input variables and the
output variable a statistical relationship. Therefore, random residual behavior is
an indication that the response surface fits the data well. On the other hand, if a
non-random structure is evident in the residuals, it is a clear sign that the response
surface does not fit the data well.
A scatter plot is a useful way of examining residual behavior. If truly random, the
residuals should be split 50-50 between positive and negative and should exhibit
something resembling a normal distribution. The residuals also should not trend
with observation order; i.e. residual size should not be a function of the
experiment number. A histogram is one way to visually check the distribution
shape of residuals. Another is a normal probability plot. This plot compares the
empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) against the CDF of a normal
function with the same mean and standard deviation; a close fit indicates data that
are distributed normally.
The response surface (Equation 6) has been compared against these metrics and the
results are favorable. The coefficient of determination is high and the residuals exhibit
good balance around zero and follow a normal distribution. The residuals are small and
do not trend with observation order. Quantitative metrics are shown in
Table 6 and a graphical representation of the residuals is shown in Figure 6.
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Table 6 - Response Surface Evaluation
RS Criterion Results / Observations
Small residuals Average residual size was 1.50 C
Coefficient of determination R = 0.985 (out of 1.0)
Residuals are centered around zero Residuals are well balanced: 14 are above
zero and 13 are below zero
For future steps in this analysis, the response surface was used as a substitute to replace
RELAP5-3D simulations. Note that several terms in the response surface were observed
to have low statistical significance, but their removal had no appreciable effect on the
results of this paper and they were therefore retained.
9.2 Quantitative Reliability Assessment
The range of values used to develop a response surface is not necessarily based on values
that are considered to be likely. For example, when used to support system design, the
ranges may be based on values the designer feels are economically viable or able to meet
design constraints. Consequently, we must perform some additional steps if we wish to
use a response surface to assess system reliability.
First, we must take a slightly different approach to the selection of predictor variable
ranges. In this case, we select each range based on the values we expect to see during
system operation. The selection of this range is usually based on engineering judgment
and may be supplemented by back-of-the-envelope calculations or simplified code runs
to verify that these values are reasonable. It should be noted that these ranges may also
be specific to the accident sequence under consideration. We may also choose variables
that cannot be directly controlled by the system designer (e.g., RVACS inlet air
temperature) but that we feel are likely to impact system performance.
This approach was used to select the predictor variables and the ranges listed in Table 5.
Each range was chosen with the objective of enveloping the values that might be seen for
the variables during an SBO event. Note that the choice of each range also expresses a
degree of epistemic uncertainty with respect to the variables. For example, RVACS
emissivity may vary according to manufacturing practices but it is expected to be no less
than 0.65 and no greater than 0.85.
To quantify this uncertainty, probability distributions are assigned to each variable.
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These distributions reflect the degree of epistemic uncertainty surrounding the value of
each predictor variable and allow us to estimate system reliability by coupling the
response surface to a Monte Carlo simulation.
Consistent with information available in the open literature, partial flow conditions such
as leakage and blockage are modeled using the exponential distribution [2, 5, 6]. This
reflects the assumption that the PSACS and RVACS are most likely unblocked and that
the probability of a blockage decreases rapidly with its severity level. PSACS blockage
is unlikely because it is a closed system and the RVACS blockage is unlikely because of
its large inlet area. In addition, an effective foreign material exclusion program,
consistent with industry best practices, would reduce the likelihood of RVACS and
PSACS blockage.
PSACS and RVACS temperatures are modeled probabilistically using the truncated
normal distribution. This decision is consistent with information available in the open
literature and reflects the assumption that ambient temperatures are more likely to be near
their mean value than extreme values [2].
A literature search did not identify previous probability density functions involving
emissivity but material conditions are often modeled using the truncated normal
distribution and this was therefore deemed acceptable [2].
When predictor variables take on values outside of those used to formulate a response
surface, extrapolation (rather than interpolation) is required and substantial inaccuracies
may occur. To avoid this pitfall, the upper and lower bounds of each range should be
consistent with the extreme percentiles of the selected distributions. In addition, we must
recognize that some distribution values may be possible mathematically but not
physically. For example, PSACS water temperatures greater than 100 oC could be seen
with a normal distribution but are not physically possible. In this case, the distributions
are truncated and renormalized to avoid simulation of non-physical scenarios. This
becomes particularly important when using a computer code that does not recognize
values that fall outside of what is physically possible. For example, RELAP5-3D cannot
model PSACS tube blockage of greater than 100%, as this would require a negative flow
area.
Response Surface Uncertainty
An important step to be performed prior to Monte Carlo simulation is the addition of an
error term to account for response-surface model uncertainty. A response surface is a
model used to approximate the behavior of a T-H code. Like any model, there is a degree
of uncertainty regarding its predictive capabilities. This uncertainty plays an important
role when calculating system reliability because near misses may actually become
failures when model uncertainty is taken into account. To account for this, we quantify
the effect of the residuals by assigning them an appropriate probability distribution.
Because residuals are distributed in a somewhat normal fashion, we can account for their
effect by adding an error term to each Monte Carlo simulation:
Yi= Yi,RS + ei (11)
where Yi = Peak Clad Temperature for simulation i
Yi,RS = Peak Clad Temperature generated by response surface
ei = Error term to account for response surface model uncertainty
The residuals under consideration have an important property: they follow a near normal
distribution (Fig. 6). As a second check, MINITAB 14 was used to check the residuals
against other types of distributions to verify that normal is the best choice. We can now
assign an error term to account for response-surface uncertainty that is normally
distributed:
(12)
The mean value of the error term, It, is equal to the statistical mean of the residuals:
- 1, -0.001p = x - '_ - = -3.7 x 10_5
n 27
(13)
The standard deviation of the error term, o, is equal to the statistical standard deviation of
the residuals:
(x - x) 2( ) 103.9
= = - 0 2.0
n-1 26
(14)
The reliability of the PSACS-RVACS with two-out-of-four trains available was assessed
by performing a Monte Carlo simulation and observing the percentage of simulations that
met the PCT failure criterion. The simulation program Crystal Ball [23] was used to
perform 106 simulations of an SBO event. Table 7 shows that that the reliability
converges rather quickly and only about 104 simulations are needed, although performing
more requires little extra time. Of the 106 simulations, approximately 110,000 resulted in
PCT > 725 0 C indicating a PSACS-RVACS unreliability of 0.11. It should be
emphasized that this value applies strictly to the case where only two-out-of-four PSACS
trains are operational. A histogram displaying the results of this effort is shown in Figure
7.
Number of Reliabili
1.000,000 Trials
Simulations
102 0.856
103 0.881
10 4  0.891
10 0.890
106 0.890
Table 7 - Convergence of Reliability Estimation
Frequency View 999,058 Displayed
4 1725.00
Figure 7 - PCT Histogram
As shown in Equation (4a), the overall system unreliability is the product of the
probability that two trains are down and the remaining two trains experience functional
: _ --- -- 
--
S-Infinity
failure. Using our numbers found previously we get a mean value of (0.11)(4.0x10-6)
4.4x10-7 and a 95t h percentile of (0.11)(1.4 x 105 ) = 1.54x10 6 .
9.3 Sensitivity Study
In order to identify potential design improvements and/or to bound safe operating
conditions it is useful to quantify the sensitivity of the response variable (PCT) to the
predictor variables. In this way, we can make risk-informed decisions about the
importance of the five predictor variables. The variables were assessed in three different
ways.
Linear Response Surface Coefficients: The sensitivity of a response variable to a given
predictor variable is roughly proportional to the size of the predictor variable's coefficient
in Eq. (2).
Factor Prioritization Method: One variable is varied over its expected range while the
others are fixed at their mean or central values. This is performed for each predictor
variable and the differences in delta PCT are compared.
Contribution to Variance: Statistical tests are used to measure how much of the PCT
variance is comprised of the variance regarding each predictor variable.
These methods provided slightly different numerical results, but the ranking of the
parameters was similar. The results are displayed in Figure 8.
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These results provide insights that are useful to both the design and operation of the
PSACS and RVACS. They show a strong sensitivity of PCT to RVACS inlet
temperature indicating that the FCRR may be inappropriate for climates with consistently
high temperatures. Another insight from this effort is that RVACS emissivity plays a
substantial role in system performance. If design improvements are not practical, this
factor should be carefully monitored by a robust QA program during the manufacturing
process to ensure adequate emissivity and a long term aging management program should
be implemented to ensure emissivity values do not degrade to unacceptable levels.
9.4 Model Uncertainty
Although not an explicit step in RSM, the issue of code uncertainty is important and
should be considered. In addition to uncertainty related to predictor variables and the
response surface approximation itself, we recognize that there is a degree of uncertainty
inherent in the models used by computer codes to predict thermal-hydraulic behavior.
Often, empirical or semi-empirical correlations are used by thermal hydraulic codes to
determine flow rates, heat transfer rates, etc. Other sources of model uncertainty include
interpolation of thermo-physical properties and approximations related to heat structure
meshing.
Therefore, let us designate Yactual the true PCT that would occur during a given set of
conditions and Ycode the PCT predicted by a computer code. We can then define the code
uncertainty related to a given simulation as [3, 24]:
si = Yactual,i - Ycode,i (15)
One approach to this issue is to conduct experimental benchmarking tests. This is an
important step in the APSRA methodology discussed in Section 1. In this case, we
would perform a series of tests to compare Yactual and Ycode. The values of c obtained
from these tests are similar to the residuals used to compare response surface results to
code results. The same approach described in Section 9.2 can then be used to
characterize a distribution that represents code uncertainty.
Lacking the capability for experimental benchmarking, we can examine the effect of code
uncertainties by performing a sensitivity study. Although this will not identify the
magnitude of code uncertainty, it will shed some light on its overall effect on reliability.
Let us assume that code uncertainty, s, is normally distributed with a mean, tc, and a
standard deviation, ac. Let us also account for response surface error by using Equation
(11). Our true estimate for PCT then becomes:
Yactual = YRS + e + E (16)
Note that we are now accounting for model uncertainty in both the response surface (e)
and the code itself (e). Ideally, this uncertainty should be quantified by comparing code
predictions to experimental results. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
We note, however, that quantification of code uncertainty is part of the APSRA
methodology [9]. This methodology identifies key drivers of code uncertainty that are
specific to the design in question. This is important because previous studies have shown
that the accuracy of best estimate codes such as RELAP5-3D varies depending on the
application. For example, benchmarking experiments performed at MIT identified
substantial discrepancies between code correlations and experimental data, particularly in
transitional flow regimes of gas coolants [25]. Other studies involving comparisons of
RELAP5-3D calculations to data from light water reactors have been more favorable
[26]. Once these drivers are identified, experimental benchmarking can be used to
quantify the amount of code error present under various conditions [24]. If enough
experiments are performed, a histogram of E can be created and a distribution fit to the
data. This distribution is then combined with the PCT histogram to create an estimation
of reliability that incorporates known code-based uncertainty drivers. This methodology
may be preferable in situations where design changes are not possible and/or the addition
of margin cannot be easily accomplished.
Since the quantification of code uncertainty is beyond our scope, we will attempt to draw
insights from a sensitivity study. We examine the effect on system reliability of various
combinations of mean and standard deviation for e (performing a Monte Carlo simulation
for each). These results are displayed in Figure 9.
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Figure 9 - The Effect of Code Uncertainty
Each point on the surface shown in Figure 9 represents a Monte Carlo simulation
consisting of 105 trials. Each trial is of the form shown in Equation (16). The assumed
mean (p) and standard deviation (ac) of code error are represented by the x and y axes.
Note that we are not supposing to know these values, but rather we are measuring their
effect on reliability, which is shown on the z-axis. The value of reliability for each point
is calculated by observing the fraction of trials that meet the success criteria of 725 'C.
The legend to the left of the figure displays the ranges of reliability that are expected to
occur for various combinations of te and ,c.
Figure 9 several useful insights. First, we observe that a negative code bias (mean value
of c < 0) only improves reliability slightly, while a positive code bias leads to a sharp
decrease in reliability. The reason for this can be seen by observing the simulations that
come close to the failure limit of 7250 C in Figure 7. There is a sizable amount of "near
misses" (PCT just below the limit) and the addition of code uncertainty changes many of
these into failures. On other hand, there aren't many "near successes" and so although
the addition of code uncertainty changes some of them into successes, the net effect on
reliability is negative.
The second major insight is that system reliability in this case study is more sensitive to
the mean value of e than to its standard deviation. This suggests a risk-informed design
strategy to reduce failure probability. During safety system design, computer simulations
are used to test system performance and optimize design parameters such as heat
exchanger size or pitch to diameter ratio. To account for uncertainty, the system designer
selects values that provide margin between calculated system performance and failure
criteria. By examining the slope of reliability with respect to ptc, the designer can
determine the sensitivity of system reliability to code uncertainty. A large slope indicates
acute sensitivity to code uncertainty and provides motivation for experimental
benchmarking and/or large design margin. By contrast, a smaller slope indicates that
model uncertainty is less important, possibly justifying reduced margin and/or lack of
benchmarking, which may allow for a more economic design.
10. CONCLUSIONS
The PSACS and RVACS safety systems play a vital role in FCRR accident mitigation.
Therefore, these systems must be able to operate under a variety of conditions and each
must perform its design function when called upon. Several phases of the FCRR project
utilized risk insights. During the design phase, a risk-informed decision making process
known as the ADP was used to facilitate the selection of a heat sink for the PSACS.
Next, a fault tree model was used to select a valve configuration that would minimize the
probability of PSACS failure. Finally, design verification was conducted by performing
an uncertainty analysis to assess the performance of the PSACS and RVACS under a
variety of T-H conditions. This effort led to several insights about safety system
performance; most notably, that RVACS inlet temperature plays a very large role during
an SBO event and that a design change to increase RVACS emissivity would be
beneficial. Additional insights were gained by performing an investigation of two
sources of model uncertainty: response surface and code.
By substituting a response surface for a T-H code, a certain degree of uncertainty is
introduced. This uncertainty was quantified by examining the difference between values
predicted by the code and those predicted by the response surface, also known as
residuals. We accounted for these residuals by adding a normally distributed error term
to each response surface simulation as shown in Equation (11).
Next, the issue of code uncertainty was addressed. An error term was used to account for
code inaccuracies and their effect on system reliability. This allowed us to observe the
relationship between code uncertainty and reliability. This relationship, displayed in
Figure 9, identifies the sensitivity of reliability to code uncertainty and provides a
quantitative metric for addressing this issue. This information can be used to choose
between two approaches for code uncertainty treatment.
The first potential approach focuses on quantification of code uncertainty, as discussed in
Section 9.4.
The second approach circumvents the issue of code-uncertainty quantification by
implementing design improvements to increase PCT margin. The addition of model
uncertainty reduces reliability because it pushes simulations close to 7250C over the
failure criterion. In other words, it turns "close calls" into failures. Furthermore, because
there are more simulations with PCT slightly below 725oC than slightly above 725°C,
even a non-biased uncertainty term will reduce calculated reliability.
To address this issue, design improvements can be made to lower the probability of
conditions that lead to a PCT near the failure limit. A great deal of effort has already
been expended on improving RVACS performance. Design enhancements include the
addition of a perforated plate in the air gap, a liquid metal within the gap between the
reactor vessel and guard vessel, and the use of dimples on the guard vessel wall. On the
other hand, the heat removal capacity of the PSACS could be improved with relatively
inexpensive design changes. For example, the PCT with all factors set to their mean
values was 714C. A 25% increase in nominal PST volume lowers this value to 700'C,
more than doubling margin. Improvements such as these would serve to offset code
uncertainty and would therefore provide greater confidence in the analysis results.
In summary, the methodology described by this paper can be used to support both passive
system design and reliability assessment. It provides a framework that can be applied to
various types of passive safety systems and can therefore be used as a tool for both
current and future reactor designs.
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12. APPENDICES
12.1 Appendix A - Valve Configuration Analysis and Supporting SAPHIRE 7
Calculations
The Passive Secondary Auxiliary Cooling System (PSACS) is a decay heat removal
system described in Section 7 of the main body of this paper. Its design function is to
remove decay heat during transients at a rate that maintains peak cladding temperature
(PCT) below 7250C for at least 72 hours with no operator actions. The PSACS is
classified as an IAEA Category C passive system because it requires no external
initiation signal but does require several valves to change state [1]. The system contains
four identical trains, each with 50% capacity and each coupled to a power conversion
system (PCS) loop. One PSACS train is shown in Figure A. 1.
PSACS 
PCS Inlet Isolation
Inlet Isolation 
Valves (C)
t Isolation
Valves (B)
Hot Leg (A) p_ "4
PSACS Storage
Tank (D) HLeg I To Turbine
S-CO2 Normal S-CO2
Transient
PSACS Heat
Exchanger(E)
Intermediate Primary Coolant
Heat Flow
Exchanger
PSACS Return
isolation
Valves (G) PCS Return Isolation
Valves (H)
From High Temp
Recuperator (J)
Figure A. 1 - One PCS Loop and PSACS Train
The PSACS must be isolated during normal operations. This limits heat removal from
the primary system and ensures that adequate inventory will be available in the PSACS
Storage Tank (PST) by preventing boiling. Furthermore, each PCS loop must be isolated
so as not to create a bypass around the PSACS. This concept is discussed in Section 8.3
of the main body of the thesis. Both the normal and transient S-CO2 flow paths are
shown in Figure A. 1.
To support a risk-informed design effort, a fault tree of the PSACS was constructed using
the code SAPHIRE 7. This fault tree captures the logic of the PSACS and PCS valve
configurations and allows for a quantitative assessment of their reliability. It is displayed
in Figure A.2
Cold Leg (F)
PCS Inlet Isolation
Valves (C)
PSCS-FAILS
Figure A.2 - PSACS Train Fault Tree
The top level event, failure of a PSACS train, occurs when either the PSACS fails to
actuate or the PCS fails to isolate. There are four ways this can occur and each requires
the simultaneous failure of two valves. Table A. I1 lists these valves and their location on
Figure A.1. These failures can occur independently or due to common cause failure
(CCF). CCF events are not displayed explicitly in Figure D.2 but are accounted for using
the Beta Factor model. This methodology is discussed in Section 8.3 of the thesis.
Valve Pair Location in Figure A.1
PSACS Inlet Isolation Valves B
PSACS Return Isolation Valves G
PCS Inlet Isolation Valves C
PCS Return Isolation Valves H
Table A. 1 - Valve Failures that Disable a PSACS Train
PSACS-FAILS-TO-ACTUATE
PCS-INLET-1-TC PCS-INLET-2-FTC PCS-RETURN-1-FTC PCS.RETURN-2-FTC PSACS-INLET-1-rTO PSACS-INLET-2-FrO PSACS-RETURN-1-TO PSACS-RETURN-2-FTO
PCS-FAILS-TO-ISOLATE
In order to assess the probability of these valve failures, we needed the probability that a
given valve would fail to open (PSACS) or close (PCS). No data for super critical CO 2
(S-C0 2) valves could be found, but we were able to locate data for both air and solenoid
operated valves with several different working fluids.
Table D. 1 - Valve Reliability Data [16]
These data demonstrate that reliability is affected by the working fluid the valves are
operating in. We selected conservatively the reliability numbers for sodium to use in our
PSACS model because they bounded the other values. Consistent with the guidance
contained in [ 16], the probability of valve failure is modeled as a lognormal distribution.
A graph of this distribution is displayed as Figure A.2. Should reliability data for S-CO2
valves become available in the future, it could easily be inserted into our fault tree model.
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Figure A.2 - Probability Density Function of the Valve Failure Rate (per demand)
12.2 Appendix B - PSACS Valve Failure Probability Calculation
The PSACS contains four identical, 50% capacity trains. Section 8.3 of the main body of
this thesis discusses the probability that two-out-of-four trains will be simultaneously
inoperable. This probability is expressed by:
Pr[failure of two trains] = Pr[independent failure of two trains] + Pr[common cause
failure of two trains ] (B1)
In this context, "independent failure" refers to the simultaneous failure of two PSACS
trains with no common cause failure (CCF) taking place. CCF refers to the failure of two
PSACS trains due in part to the failure of all air-operated valves (AOVs) or solenoid
operated valves (SOVs) in the PSACS system.
To get a clearer understanding of these failure types, it is useful to examine a diagram of
the PSACS along with a list of the minimal cut sets for the failure of one PSACS train.
Figure B.1 - One PCS Loop and PSACS Train
Cut Set Failures Mean
No. Probability
1 PSACS Inlet AOV and PSACS Inlet SOV 9 x 106
2 PSACS Return AOV and PSACS Return SOV 9 x 10-6
3 PCS Inlet AOV and PCS Inlet SOV 9 x 10-
4 PCS Return AOV and PCS Return SOV 9 x 10-1
5 CCF -SOV and PSACS Inlet AOV 1.5 x 10 '
6 CCF -SOV and PSACS Return AOV 1.5 x 10'
7 CCF -SOV and PCS Inlet AOV 1.5 x 10-
8 CCF -SOV and PCS Return AOV 1.5 x 10-
9 CCF-AOV and PSACS Inlet SOV 1.5 x 10-
10 CCF-AOV and PSACS Return SOV 1.5 x 10-
11 CCF-AOV and PCS Inlet AOV 1.5 x 105
12 CCF-AOV and PCS Return AOV 1.5 x 10'
Table B. 1 - PSACS Minimal Cut Sets
PSACS Storage
Tank (D)
PSACS Heat
Exchanger (E)
To Turbine
Each cut set represents a combination of valve failures that leads to the failure of a single
PSACS train. Cut sets 1-4 contain only independent failures and cut sets 5-12 contain
CCFs. The probabilities of each cut set were calculated using the codes SAPHIRE 7 and
Crystal Ball, along with the valve reliability data described in Appendix A. The function
of this appendix is to explain how the probability of failure of two PSACS trains is
calculated. Therefore, although our analysis used computer codes to account for
epistemic uncertainty surrounding failure rates and the Beta Factor, all values shown in
these calculations are point estimates (mean values).
The probability of cut sets 1-4 can be expressed as:
Pr[1...4] = Pr[valve 1 fails] x Pr[valve 2 fails] = 3 x 10 3 * 3 x 10-3 = 9 x 10-6
The total probability of independent failure can be determined by summing the
probabilities of cut sets 1-4. This approach, known as the minimal cut set upper bound
approximation, is accurate provided that the probability of the top level event (in this
case, failure of a PSACS train) is small.
Pr[independent failure of one train] = 4 (9 x 10-6) = 3.6 x 10-5
Since no CCF is present in these cut sets, we can express the probability that two trains
fail in this way as simply:
Pr [independent failure of two trains] = (Pr[independent failure of one train]) 2 = 1.3 x 1 0-
Cut sets 5-12 involve CCF and make use of the conservative Beta Factor model. Here,
we are assuming that a fraction of all valve failures, 3, results in CCF of all nominally
identical valves in the PSACS. Based on common practice, 0 is assumed to be
lognormally distributed with a mean value of 0.10 and an error factor of 3. Again, this is
quite conservative because it assumes that, on average, the failure of one AOV or SOV
results in the failure of all 15 other valves of that type in the PSACS system 10% of the
time.
The probability of each cut set 5-8 can be expressed as:
Pr[5...8] = Pr [CCF of all SOVs] * Pr[any AOV in the train fails]
= P Pr[any SOV in system fails] * Pr[any AOV the in train fails]
Similarly, the probability of each cut set 9-12 can be expressed as:
Pr[9...12] = Pr [CCF of all SOVs] * Pr[any AOV in the train fails]
= 3 Pr[any SOV in system fails] * Pr[any AOV in the train fails]
To find the total probability of SOV CCF of one train, we sum the probabilities of cut
sets 5-8:
4 (1.5 x 105) = 6 x 10-5
Likewise, to find the total probability of AOV CCF of one train, we sum the probabilities
of cut sets 5-8:
4 (1.5 x 10-5) = 6 x 10-5
Cut sets 5-12 result in just one disabled train of PSACS; however, the remaining three
trains have all AOVs or SOVs failed. Therefore, each of the remaining three trains is just
one valve failure away from also becoming inoperable.
In either case, one failure of the opposite valve type will result in a second failed PSACS
train. The PSACS contains four AOVs and four SOVs per train, for a total of 16 of each
type. When one train has already failed, there are 12 AOVs and 12 SOVs in the
remaining three trains. Given CCF of all SOVs (cut sets 5-8) only one AOV failure is
needed to fail one of the remaining three PSACS trains. Conversely, if CCF of all AOVs
has occurred (cut sets 9-12), then failure of one SOV in a remaining PSACS train results
in that train being disabled.
Therefore, when one PSACS train has failed due to CCF, the probability that another
train will fail is equal to the probability that at least one valve of the opposite type will
fail somewhere in the remaining three trains. Since there are twelve such valves, we can
express this probability using the binomial theorem:
Pr[at least one valve fails] = 1 - Pr[no valves fail] = 1 - (1 - q )n
where n = the number of valves
q = the probability of valve failure
Using our valve reliability numbers, we obtain:
Pr[at least one valve fails] = 1 - (1 - 3 x 103)12= 0.035
Therefore, any time a PSACS train fails due to CCF, there is a 3.5% chance that a second
PSACS train will also fail. Plugging in our numbers from earlier, we have:
Pr [two trains fail due to AOV CCF] = 6 x 10-5* 0.035 = 2.1 x 10-6
Pr [two trains fail due to SOV CCF] = 6 x 10-5 * 0.035 = 2.1 x 10-6
63
Finally, we write the total failure probability of two trains as the sum of the probability of
independent failures and the two CCF scenarios:
Pr [two trains fail] = 1.3 x 10-9 + 2.1 x 10-6 + 2.1 x 10-6 4.2 x 10-6
Note that this value is a point estimate because we model q and P as point estimates.
Using the codes SAPHIRE 7 and Crystal Ball allows us to model q and 0 as distributions
to account for epistemic uncertainty surrounding their values. We then obtain a mean
value of 4.0 x 10-6 and a 9 5 th percentile of 1.4 x 105 .
12.3 Appendix C - Screened Predictor Variables
During development of the response surface, a number of predictor variables factors were
analyzed and determined to be of negligible importance to the SBO case. It is important
to note that while these factors were screened out, they may play an important role in
other transients or design configurations. For example, when analyzing an unprotected
transient, consideration of reactivity coefficients would be very important.
Input Parameter Basis for non-inclusion
Core oxidation heat transfer resistance Very low ATfilm
PSACS heat exchanger fouling factor Order of magnitude difference between
enthalpy of H20 and S-CO 2
Core roughness Natural circulation of primary coolant is
not an issue
Non-condensable gas buildup in PCS PCS utilizes a non-condensing power cycle
Piping layout error Head loss in IHX >> Head loss in piping
Heat loss through piping (missing or Captured by pipe-to-fluid heat transfer
damaged insulation) assessment
PSACS pipe roughness Head loss in IHX >> Head loss in piping
IHX fouling factor Large surface area of IHX - substantial
margin
Partially failed PSACS isolation valve Extremely low probability due to parallel
configuration
Partially failed PCS isolation valve Extremely low probability due to series
configuration
Pressure loss due to PSACS leakage RELAP5-3D simulations demonstrated
effects to be very low
Reactivity Coefficients Negligible effects due to SCRAM
Table C. 1 -Screening Justifications
12.4 Appendix D - RELAP5-3D Input Deck
= 2400 Lead-cooled Reactor Model with PCS and PSACS
0000001 11
0000100 restart transnt
0000101 run
0000103 -1 reset
* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
0000102 si si
107111
*----------------------------------------------------------------------
0000201 3. 1.0e-8 0.001 0007 1'
0000202 200. 1.0e-8 0.01 0007 1
0000203 500. 1.Oe-6 0.05 0007 1
0000204 1000. 1.0e-6 0.05 0007
0000205 10000. 1.0e-6 0.1 0007
0000206 20000. 1.Oe-6 0.1 0007
0000207 50000. 1.0e-6 0.1 0007
0000208 260000. 1.0e-6 0.1 0007
00 20000
00 20000
00 20000
100 20000
1000 2000
1000 2000
1000 2000
1000 200(
200000 * trancalc
200000 * trancalc
200000 * trancalc
200000 * trancalc
'0 200000 * trancalc
'0 200000 * trancalc
'0 200000 * trancalc
)0 200000 * trancalc
*------- 
20600000 expanded
* ~---------------------------------------------------------------------
** TRIPS
** ACTIVE
**========-=================--==--=-----================-=======
===== === ==== *
20605010 time 0 ge null
20605100 time 0 ge null
20605950 time 0 ge null
20603010 time 0 ge null
20604010 time 0 ge null
** decouple generators from
20606000 time 0 ge null
20607010 time 0 ge null
20607020 time 0 ge null
20607030 time 0 ge null
**
0 0.
0 0.000
0 0.000
0 0.000
0 0.000
grid
0 0.000
0 0.000
0 0.000
0 0.000
1 * rx trip
1 * rx trip
1 * trip pump
1 * tdvlm pump
1 * tdvlm pump
* trip xl generator
* trip x3 generators
* trip x3 generators
* trip x3 generators
*** open gas cycle bypass valves (this line sets delay between LOEL and valve actuation
20606090 time 0 ge timeof 600 0.000 n * open PCB and turbine bypass valves
lx
20607090 time 0 ge timeof 701 0.000 n * open PCB and turbine bypass valves
3x
20608090 time 0 ge timeof 702 0.000 n * open PCB and turbine bypass valves
3x
20609090 time 0 ge timeof 703 0.000 n * open PCB and turbine bypass valves
3x
*Transient Conditions - scenario A
-**===== = =  
=
------ == ----= == *
* determines how long to leave the inlet ihx valves open before reclosing - 323
* when timeof = 0.0, the valve remains closed
20605860 time 0 ge timeof 609 100000. n * timer to reclose lx inlet ihx vlvs
20605960 time 0 ge timeof 709 100000. n * timer to reclose 3x inlet ihx vlvs
20605810 time 0 ge timeof 809 0.000 n * timer to reclose 3x inlet ihx vlvs
20605820 time 0 ge timeof 909 0.000 n * timer to reclose 3x inlet ihx vlvs
* determines how long to leave the outlet ihx valves open before reclosing - 324
* * when timeof = 0.0, the valve remains closed
20605890 time 0 ge timeof 609 100000. n * timer to reclose lx outlet ihx vlvs
20605990 time 0 ge timeof 709 100000. n * timer to reclose 3x outlet ihx vlvs
20605910 time 0 ge timeof 809 0.000 n * timer to reclose 3x outlet ihx vlvs
20605920 time 0 ge timeof 909 0.000 n * timer to reclose 3x outlet ihx vlvs
* logical trips for gas cycle bypass valve opening and closing
20615860 609 and -586 n * inlet ihx lx - 323
20615960 709 and -596 n * inlet ihx 3x - 423
20615810 809 and -581 n * inlet ihx 3x - 223
20615820 909 and -582 n * inlet ihx 3x - 123
20615890 609 and -589 n * outlet ihx lx - 324
20615990 709 and -599 n * outlet ihx 3x - 424
20615910 809 and -591 n * outlet ihx 3x - 224
20615920 909 and -592 n * outlet ihx 3x - 124
5950000 rcpl pump
* area length volume
5950101 1.332 2.05 0.0
* azim angle Incl angle elevation flags
5950102 0.00 -90.0 -2.05 00000
* Suction junction flag
5950108 590000000 0.0 0.02 0.02 001000
* Discharge jnction
5950109 500010004 0.0 0.02 0.02 001000
* Suction junction diameter
5950110 0.65 0.00 1.00 1.00
5950111 0.65 0.00 1.00 1.00
* Pump volume IC
* ebt
5950200 3 8.80109E+05 751.650
* Suction junction IC
5950201 1 173600.0 0.0 0.
* Discharge jnction IC
5950202 1 173600.0 0.0 0.
* Pump index and options
* Westinghouse pump
* two-phase option is not to be used
* W(2)=-1 -> W(3)=-3
* | no pump motor torque table index
* I I pump velocity table is entered
* |I I | PUMP TRIP number index
* | no reverse
5950301 -2 -1 -3 -1 -1 595 0
* Pump description
* Rated pump velocity (rads/sec)
* Ratio of initial pump velocity to rated pump velocity
* [[ Rated flow (m3/s)
* rated head (m)
* 0.77 .999474 7.087 8.7643
*5950302 102.77 .999474 17.087 8.76143
5950302 102.77 .999474 17.087 8.76143
* Rated torque (N*m)
* [Moment of inertia (kg*m2)
* I Rated density (kg/m3)
* Rated pump motor torque (N*m)
*5950303 1.45187E+05 28720.6 10160. 0.00
5950303 1.45187E+05 28720.6 10160. 0.00
* Second frictional torque coefficient (N*m)
* Constant frictional torque coefficient (N*m)
* First frictional torque coefficient (N*m)
* Third frictional torque coefficient (N*m)
5950304 1451.87 1451.87 0.00 0.00
* Beginning of PSACS water-side model - 1
-Bgn---- --s--
* Beginning of PSACS water-side model
-- 
- -
*== = = = = = = = = = = = = = = == = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
=== == === == ==
*hydro
9410000
component name
lwrplen
component type
branch
*----------------------------------------------------------------------$
* no. juns vel/flow
9410001 2 1
area length
28.27433388
horz angle
0.0
roughness
0.0
1.0
volume
0.0
vert angle
90.0 1.0
hyd diam
5.656854249
delta z
*hydro ebt pressure tempe
9410200 3 2.e5 300.00
* from to area
9411101 941010000 960000
9412101 939010000 941010
* velf velg veli
9411201 0.0 0.0 0.0
9412201 0.0 0.0 0.0
* hyd dia beta y-int
9411110 0.0 0.00 1.00
9412110 0.0 0.00 1.00
Kf
000
000
sl
Kr
0.0
0.0
efvcahs
0.0 0.0 0001100
0.0 0.0 0001100
ope
1.00
1.00
*hydro
9410101
*
*hydro
9410102
*hydro
9410103
IF F = = = - - - - -- - - - - - -
r
9600000 htrcph pipe
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* no. vols
9600001 10
* vol area
9600101 1.3477723 10
* length
9600301 0.4 10
* volume
9600401 0.0 10
* azim angle
9600501 0.0 10
* incl angle
9600601 90.0 10
9600701 0.4 10
* roughness hyd dia
9600801 4.572e-6 0.1751058 10
* kf kr
9600901 0.0 0.0 9
* pvbfe
9601001 00000 10
* fvcahs
9601101 001000 9
* ebt
9601201 3 1.5E5 300.00 0.0 0.0. 10
* vel/flow
9601300 0
* liquid vapor int-face
9601301 0.0 0.0 0.0 9
*hydro jun diam beta intercept slope jun
9601401 0.1751058 0.0 1.0 1.0 9
*hydro component name component type
9400000 inlet sngljun
---------------------------------------------------------------------
*hydro from to area floss r loss vcahs
9400101 960010000 937000000 0.0 0.0 0.0 01100
*
*hydro vel/flw f flowrate g flowrate j flowrate
9400201 0 0.0 0.0 0.
*hydro dhjun beta c m
9400110 0.1751058 0.0 1.0 1.0
*....-----------------------------
*hydro component name component type
9370000 upplen pipe
*--------------------------------------------------------------
* no. vols
9370001 8
* vol area
9370101 28.27433388 8
* length
9370301 1.0 8
* volume
9370401 0.0 8
* azim angle
9370501 0.0 8
* incl angle
9370601 90.0 8
9370701 1.0 8
* roughness hyd dia
9370801 0.0 6.0 8
* kf kr
9370901 0.0 0.0 7
* pvbfe
9371001 00000 8
* fvcahs
9371101 001000 7
* ebt
9371201 3 1.5e5 300.00 0.0 0. 0. 1
9371202 3 1.1e5 300.00 0.0 0. 0. 8
* vel/flow
9371300 0
* liquid vapor int-face
9371301 0.0 0. 0. 7
*hydro jun diam beta intercept slope jun
9371401 4.638663543 0.0 1.0 1.0 7
*hydro component name component type
9380000 inlet sngljun
* ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ *
*hydro from to area floss r loss vcahs
9380101 937000000 939000000 0.0 0.0 0.0 01100
*hydro vel/flw f flowrate g flowrate j flowrate
9380201 0 0.0 0.0 0.
*hydro dhjun beta c m
9380110 4.638663543 0.0 1.0 1.0
*
*hydro component name component type
9390000 maintube annulus
*--------------------------------------------------------------$
* no. vols
9390001 4
* vol area
9390101 26.8188 4
* length
9390301 1.0 4
* volume
9390401 0.0 4
* azim angle
9390501 0.0 4
* incl angle
9390601 -90.0 4
9390701 -1.0 4
* roughness hyd dia
9390801 0.0 4.302037559 4
* kf kr
9390901 0.0 0.0 3
* pvbfe
9391001 00000 4
* fvcahs
9391101 001000 3
* ebt
9391201 3 1.6e5 300.00 0.0 0. 0. 1
9391202 3 1.9e5 300.00 0.0 0.0. 4
* vel/flow
9391300 0
* liquid vapor int-face
9391301 0.0 0. 0. 3
*hydro jun diam beta intercept slope jun
9391401 4.302037559 0.0 1.0 1.0 3
9350000 source tmdpvol
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* area length volume
9350101 100. 1.0 0.0
* azim angle incl angle delta z
9350102 0.00 0.0 0.0
* roughness hyd dia pvbfe
9350103 0.00000 0.0000 00010
* ebt trip search var
9350200 003 0
* indep var
* pressure (Pa) / temperature (K)
9350201 0.00 1.E5 300.00
*9360000 outlet tmdpjun
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*hydro from to area
*9360101 935010000 937000000 1.05
* vel/flow trip search var
*9360200 1 0
* indep var
* mass flow rate liq. gas interface
*9360201 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
*9360202 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
**------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
9360000 exit sngljun
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
9360101 937010000 935000000 0.001 100.0 100.0 01100
9360201 0 0.0 0.0 0.*
9360110 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
-*
*==== --=================================-
* Beginning of PSACS water-side model - 2
----- *
* Beginning of PSACS water-side model
***======== ==------------ ---------------
*hydro component name component type
9110000 lwrplen branch
*----------------------------------------------------------------------$
* no. juns vel/flow
9110001 2 1
*hydro area length volume
28.27433388
horz angle
0.0
roughness
0.0
*hydro ebt pressure tempe
9110200 3 2.e5 300.00
* from to area Kf
9111101 911010000 961000000
9112101 909010000 911010000
* velf
9111201 0.0
9112201 0.0
* hyd dia
9111110 0.0
9112110 0.0
**-=-- ====
Kr
0.0
0.0
efvcahs
0.0 0.0 0001100
0.0 0.0 0001100
velg veli
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
beta
0.00
0.00
y-int
1.00
1.00
slope
1.00
1.00
9610000 htrcph pipe
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* no. vols
9610001 10
* vol area
9610101 1.23636 10
* length
9610301 0.4 10
* volume
9610401 0.0 10
* azim angle
9610501 0.0 10
* incl angle
9610601 90.0 10
9610701 0.4 10
* roughness hyd dia
9610801 4.572e-6 0.1751058 10
* kf kr
9610901 0.0 0.0 9
* pvbfe
9611001 00000 10
* fvcahs
9611101 001000 9
* ebt
9611201 3 1.5E5 300.00 0.0 0.0. 10
9110101
*hydro
9110102
*hydro
9110103
0.0
delta z
1.0
1.0
vert angle
90.0
hyd diam
6.0
----------------------------------------
* vel/flow
9611300 0
* liquid vapor int-face
9611301 0.0 0.0 0.0 9
*hydro jun diam beta intercept slope jun
9611401 0.1751058 0.0 1.0 1.0 9
*hydro component name component type
9100000 inlet sngljun
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
*hydro from to area floss rloss vcahs
9100101 961010000 907000000 0.0 0.0 0.0 01100
*hydro vel/flw f flowrate g flowrate j flowrate
9100201 0 0.0 0.0 0.
*hydro dhjun beta c m
9100110 0.1751058 0.0 1.0 1.0
*hydro component name component type
9070000 upplen pipe
*----------------------------------------------------------------------$
* no. vols
9070001 8
* vol area
9070101 28.27433388 8
* length
9070301 1.0 8
* volume
9070401 0.0 8
* azim angle
9070501 0.0 8
* incl angle
9070601 90.0 8
9070701 1.0 8
* roughness hyd dia
9070801 0.0 6.0 8
* kf kr
9070901 0.0 0.0 7
* pvbfe
9071001 00000 8
* fvcahs
9071101 001000 7
* ebt
9071201 3 1.5e5
9071202 3 1.1e5
* vel/flow
9071300 0
300.00
300.00
0.0 0.0.
0.0 0. 0.
* liquid vapor int-face
9071301 0.0 0. 0. 7
*hydro jun diam beta intercept slope
9071401 4.638663543 0.0 1.0 1.0
1
8
jun
7
================*
*hydro
9080000
component name component type
inlet sngljun
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
*hydro from to
9080101 907000000
*hydro
9080201
*hydro
9080110
vel/flw
0
area floss
909000000 0.0
f flowrate g flowrate
0.0 0.0 0.
dhjun beta
4.638663543 0.0
c m
1.0
r loss vcahs
0.0 0.0
j flowrate
1.0
*hydro
9090000
component name component type
maintube annulus
*-------------------------------------------------------------$
* no. vols
9090001 4
* vol area
9090101 26.8188 4
* length
9090301 1.0 4
* volume
9090401 0.0 4
* azim angle
9090501 0.0 4
* incl angle
9090601 -90.0 4
9090701 -1.0 4
* roughness
9090801 0.0
* kf kr
9090901 0.0
* pvbfe
9091001 00000
* fvcahs
hyd dia
4.302037559 4
0.0
01100
~~--------------------------------------
----------------------------------------
9091101 001000 3
* ebt
9091201 3 1.6e5 300.00 0.0 0. 0. 1
9091202 3 1.9e5 300.00 0.0 0.0. 4
* vel/flow
9091300 0
* liquid vapor int-face
9091301 0.0 0. 0. 3
*hydro jun diam beta intercept slope jun
9091401 4.302037559 0.0 1.0 1.0 3
9050000 source tmdpvol
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* area length volume
9050101 100. 1.0 0.0
* azim angle incl angle delta z
9050102 0.00 0.0 0.0
* roughness hyd dia pvbfe
9050103 0.00000 0.0000 00010
* ebt trip search var
9050200 003 0
* indep var
* pressure (Pa) / temperature (K)
9050201 0.00 1.E5 300.00
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
9060000 exit sngljun
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
9060101 907010000 905000000 0.001 100.0 100.0 01100
9060201 0 0.0 0.0 0. *
9060110 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
***=
*hydro component name component type
9210000 lwrplen branch
*----------------------------------------------------------------------$
* no. juns vel/flow
9210001 2 1
*hydro area length volume
9210101 28.27433388 1.0 0.0
*
*hydro
9210102
*hydro
9210103
horz angle
0.0
roughness
0.0
vert angle
90.0
hyd diam
6.0
*hydro ebt pressure tempe
9210200 3 2.e5 300.00
* from to area Kf
9211101 921010000 962000000
9212101 919010000 921010000
* velf
9211201 0.0
9212201 0.0
* hyd dia
9211110 0.0
9212110 0.0
Kr
0.0
0.0
delta z
1.0
efvcahs
0.0 0.0 0001100
0.0 0.0 0001100
velg veli
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
beta
0.00
0.00
y-int
1.00
1.00
slope
1.00
1.00
9620000 htrcph pipe
------------------------------------------------------------------------- *
* no. vols
9620001 10
* vol area
9620101 1.23636 10
* length
9620301 0.4 10
* volume
9620401 0.0 10
* azim angle
9620501 0.0 10
* incl angle
9620601 90.0 10
9620701 0.4 10
* roughness hyd dia
9620801 4.572e-6 0.1751058 10
* kf kr
9620901 0.0 0.0 9
* pvbfe
9621001 00000 10
* fvcahs
9621101 001000 9
* ebt
9621201 3 1.5E5 300.00
* vel/flow
9621300 0
0.0 0. 0. 10
IF I
* liquid vapor int-face
9621301 0.0 0.0 0.0 9
*hydro jun diam beta intercept slope jun
9621401 0.1751058 0.0 1.0 1.0 9
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
component name component type
inlet sngljun
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
*hydro
9200101
from to
962010000
*hydro vel/flw
9200201 0
*hydro dh
9200110 0,
area
917000000
floss
0.0
f flowrate g flowrate
0.0
jun beta
.1751058 0.0
r loss vcahs
0.0 0.0
j flowrate
0.0 0.
c m
1.0 1.0
component name
upplen
component type
pipe
*----------------------------------------------------------------------$
* no. vols
9170001 8
* vol area
9170101 28.27433388 8
* length
9170301 1.0 8
* volume
9170401 0.0 8
* azim angle
9170501 0.0 8
* incl angle
9170601 90.0 8
9170701 1.0 8
* roughness
9170801 0.0
* kf kr
9170901 0.0
* pvbfe
9171001 00000
hyd dia
6.0 8
0.0
* fvcahs
9171101 001000
* ebt
9171201
9171202
3 1.5e5 300.00
3 1.1e5 300.00
0.0 0.0. 1
0.0 0.0. 8
*hydro
9200000
01100
~IC
$
*hydro
9170000
----------------------------- ~
* vel/flow
9171300 0
* liquid vapor int-face
9171301 0.0 0. 0. 7
*hydro jun diam beta intercept slope jun
9171401 4.638663543 0.0 1.0 1.0 7
*hydro component name component type
9180000 inlet sngljun
------------------------------------------------------------------------- *
*hydro from to area floss r loss vcahs
9180101 917000000 919000000 0.0 0.0 0.0 01100
*
*hydro vel/flw f flowrate g flowrate j flowrate
9180201 0 0.0 0.0 0.
*hydro dhjun beta c m
9180110 4.638663543 0.0 1.0 1.0
*hydro component name component type
9190000 maintube annulus
*-------------------------------------------------------------$
* no. vols
9190001 4
* vol area
9190101 26.8188 4
* length
9190301 1.0 4
* volume
9190401 0.0 4
* azim angle
9190501 0.0 4
* incl angle
9190601 -90.0 4
9190701 -1.0 4
* roughness hyd dia
9190801 0.0 4.302037559 4
* kf kr
9190901 0.0 0.0 3
* pvbfe
9191001 00000 4
* fvcahs
9191101 001000 3
* ebt
80
9191201 3 1.6e5 300.00 0.0 0. 0. 1
9191202 3 1.9e5 300.00 0.0 0.0. 4
* vel/flow
9191300 0
* liquid vapor int-face
9191301 0.0 0. 0. 3
*hydro jun diam beta intercept slope jun
9191401 4.302037559 0.0 1.0 1.0 3
9150000 source tmdpvol
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
area length volume
9150101 100. 1.0 0.0
* azim angle incl angle delta z
9150102 0.00 0.0 0.0
* roughness hyd dia pvbfe
9150103 0.00000 0.0000 00010
* ebt trip search var
9150200 003 0
* indep var
* pressure (Pa) / temperature (K)
9150201 0.00 1.E5 300.00
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
9160000 exit sngljun
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
9160101 917010000 915000000 0.001 100.0 100.0 01100
9160201 0 0.0 0.0 0. *
9160110 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
*------------------------------------------ ------ --------------
*hydro component name component type
9310000 lwrplen branch
*----------------------------------------------------------------------$
no. juns vel/flow
9310001 2 1
*hydro area length volume
9310101 28.27433388 1.0 0.0
*hydro horz angle vert angle delta z
9310102 0.0 90.0 1.0
*hydro roughness hyd diam fe
*hydro ebt pressure tempe
9310200 3 2.e5 300.00
* from to area Kf Kr efvcahs
9311101 931010000 963000000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0001100
9312101 9290100009310100000.0 0.0 0.0 0001100
* velf
9311201 0.0
9312201 0.0
velg veli
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
* hyd dia beta y-int slope
9311110 0.0 0.00 1.00 1.00
9312110 0.0 0.00 1.00 1.00
* ----------------------------------------------------------------
9630000 htrcph pipe
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* no. vols
9630001 10
* vol area
9630101 1.23636 10
* length
9630301 0.4 10
* volume
9630401 0.0 10
* azim angle
9630501 0.0 10
* incl angle
9630601 90.0 10
9630701 0.4 10
* roughness hyd dia
9630801 4.572e-6 0.1751058 10
* kf kr
9630901 0.0 0.
* pvbfe
9631001 00000
* fvcahs
9631101 001000
* ebt
9631201 3 1.5E5
* vel/flow
9631300 0
* liquid vapo
.0
300.00
ir int-face
0.0 0. 0. 10
9631301 0.0 0.0 0.0 9
*hydro jun diam beta intercept slope jun
9631401 0.1751058 0.0 1.0 1.0 9
9310103 0.0 6.0
*hydro component name component type
9300000 inlet sngljun
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
*hydro from to area floss r loss vcahs
9300101 963010000 927000000 0.0 0.0 0.0 01100
*hydro vel/flw f flowrate g flowrate j flowrate
9300201 0 0.0 0.0 0.
*hydro dhjun beta c m
9300110 0.1751058 0.0 1.0 1.0
*hydro component name component type
9270000 upplen pipe
----------------------------------------------------------------- $
* no. vols
9270001 8
* vol area
9270101 28.27433388 8
* length
9270301 1.0 8
* volume
9270401 0.0 8
* azim angle
9270501 0.0 8
* incl angle
9270601 90.0 8
9270701 1.0 8
* roughness hyd dia
9270801 0.0 6.0 8
* kf kr
9270901 0.0 0.0 7
* pvbfe
9271001 00000 8
* fvcahs
9271101 001000 7
* ebt
9271201 3 1.5e5 300.00 0.0 0. 0. 1
9271202 3 l.1e5 300.00 0.0 0. 0. 8
* vel/flow
9271300 0
* liquid vapor int-face
9271301 0.0 0. 0. 7
*hydro jun diam beta intercept slope jun
9271401 4.638663543 0.0 1.0 1.0 7
*hydro component name component type
9280000 inlet sngljun
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
*hydro from to area floss rloss vcahs
9280101 927000000 929000000 0.0 0.0 0.0 01100
*hydro vel/flw f flowrate g flowrate j flowrate
9280201 0 0.0 0.0 0.
*hydro dhjun beta c m
9280110 4.638663543 0.0 1.0 1.0
* ------------------------------------------------------------------
*hydro component name component type
9290000 maintube annulus
*------- ------------------------------------------------------ $
* no. vols
9290001 4
* vol area
9290101 26.8188 4
* length
9290301 1.0 4
* volume
9290401 0.0 4
* azim angle
9290501 0.0 4
* incl angle
9290601 -90.0 4
9290701 -1.0 4
* roughness hyd dia
9290801 0.0 4.302037559 4
* kf kr
9290901 0.0 0.0 3
* pvbfe
9291001 00000 4
* fvcahs
9291101 001000 3
* ebt
9291201 3 1.6e5 300.00 0.0 0. 0. 1
9291202 3 1.9e5 300.00 0.0 0.0. 4
* vel/flow
9291300 0
* liquid vapor int-face
9291301 0.0 0. 0. 3
*hydro jun diam beta
9291401 4.302037559
intercept slope
0.0 1.0 1.0
jun
*== = = = = = = = = == = = = = = = = = == = = = = = = = =
9250000 source tmdpvol
- - --*  - - - - - - - - - - - - -
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* area
9250101 100.
* azim angle
9250102 0.00
* roughness
9250103 0.00000
* ebt trip
9250200 003 1
* indep var
length
1.0
volume
0.0
incl angle delta z
0.0 0.0
hyd dia
0.0000
search var
pvbfe
00010
* pressure (Pa) / temperature (K)
9250201 0.00 1.E5 300.00
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
9260000 exit sngljun
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
9260101 927010000
9260201 0
9260110 0
0.0
.0 0.0
925000000 0.001
0.0 0.*
1.0 1.0
100.0 100.0 01100
-i- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
*pass
* turbine bypass valve lx
3230000 inlet valve
* - - - -*-- - - - - - - - - - - - -
3230101
3230201
305010000 312000000 .1 0.0 0.0 00100
0. 0.* 0.
3230300 mtrvlv
3230301 1586 586 2.5 0. 306
3120000 hotductl pipe
* no. vols
3120001 1
* vol area
3120101 0.2 1
* length
3120301 2.0 1
* volume
3120401 0.0 1
* azim angle
3120501 0.00 1
* incl angle
3120601 90.0 1
* delta z
3120701 2.0 1
* roughness hyd dia
3120801 0.0 0.54627 1
* pvbfe
3121001 00000 1
* fvcahs
*3121101 001000 2
* ebt
*3121201 0 19250782. 872104. 872104. 1. 0. 1
*3121202 0 19250124. 872104. 872104. 1. 0. 2
3121201 0 13419192. 828592. 828592. 1. 0. 1
*hydro component name component type
3130000 upplen branch
*-------------------------------------------------------------$
no. juns vel/flow
3130001 2 0
*hydro area length volume
3130101 0.35 0.5 0.0
*
*hydro horz angle vert angle delta z
3130102 0.0 -90.0 -0.5
*hydro roughness hyd diam fe
3130103 0.0 0.667558 0
*hydro ebt pressure tempe
3130200 0 13418526. 822879.822879.1.
* from to area Kf Kr efvcahs
3131101 312010000 313000000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0001100
3132101 313010000 314000000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0001100
* velf velg veli
3131201 1.022885-9 1.022885-9 0. * 1.85752-8
3132201 1.917845-8 1.917845-8 0. * 2.691416-8
* hyd dia beta y-int slope
3131110 0.0 0.00 1.00 1.00
3132110 0.0 0.00 1.00 1.00
3140000 htrcpc pipe
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* no. vols
3140001 10
* vol area
3140101 0.0613274 10
* length
3140301 0.4 10
* volume
3140401 0.0 10
* azim angle
3140501 0.0 10
* incl angle
3140601 -90.0 10
* roughness hyd dia
3140801 0.0 8.00E-03 10
* kf kr
3140901 0.0 - 0.0 9
* pvbfe
3141001 00000 10
* fvcahs
3141101 001000 9
* ebt
3141201 3 1.97E7 773.31 0.0 0.0. 10
* vel/flow
3141300 1
* liquid vapor int-face
3141301 0.0 0.0 0. 9
*hydro jun diam beta intercept slope jun
3141401 8.00E-03 0.0 1.0 1.0 9
*hydro component name component type
3160000 lwrplen branch
*--------------------------------------------------------------$
* no. juns vel/flow
3160001 2 0
*hydro area length volume
3160101 0.35 0.5 0.0
*hydro horz angle vert angle delta z
3160102 0.0 -90.0 -0.5
*hydro roughness hvd diam fe
0.667558
*hydro ebt pressure tempe
3160200 0 13452753. 775247. 775247. 1.
* from to area Kf Kr efvcahs
3161101 314010000 316000000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0001100
3162101 316010000 317000000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0001100
* velf velg veli
3161201 -2.54965-8 -2.54965-8 0. * -3.85307-8
3162201 -1.513218-9 -1.513218-9 0. * -2.98207-8
* hyd dia beta y-int slope
3161110 0.0 0.00 1.00 1.00
3162110 0.0 0.00 1.00 1.00
3170000 htrcpc pipe
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* no. vols
3170001 3
* vol area
3170101 0.2 3
* length
3170301 1.0
* volume
3170401 0.0
3 *1.666666667
3
* azim angle
3170501 0.0 3
* incl angle
3170601 90.0 3
* roughness hyd dia
3170801 0.0 0.504627
* kf
3170901 0.0 0.0 2
* pvbfe
3171001 00000 3
* fvcahs
3171101 001000 2
* ebt
3171201 0 13452511.
3171202 0 13451545.
3171203 0 13450579.
* vel/flow
3171300 0
775445.
775422.
775413.
* liquid vapor int-face
3171301 -1.008844-9 -1.008844-9
3171302 -5.04444-10 -5.04444-10
775445. 1.0.
775422. 1.0.
775413. 1.0.
0. 1 * -1.988044-8
0. 2 * -9.94011-9
3160103 0.0
*hydro jun diam beta intercept slope jun
3171401 0.504627 0.0 1.0 1.0 2
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* turbine bypass valve lx
3240000 outlet valve
* ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ *
3240101 317010000 395000000 .1 0.0 0.0 00100
3240201 0 0. 0. 0. * 0.
3240300 mtrvlv
3240301 1589 589 2.5 0. 306
*pass
**------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* turbine bypass valve lx
2230000 inlet valve
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
2230101 205010000 212000000 .1 0.0 0.0 00100
2230201 0 0. 0 0. 0.* 0.
2230300 mtrvlv
2230301 1581 581 2.5 0. 206
2120000 hotductl pipe
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* no. vols
2120001 1
* vol area
2120101 0.2 1
* length
2120301 2.0 1
* volume
2120401 0.0 1
* azim angle
2120501 0.00 1
* incl angle
2120601 90.0 1
* delta z
2120701 2.0 1
* roughness hyd dia
2120801 0.0 0.54627 1
* pvbfe
2121001 00000 1
* fvcahs
*3121101 001000 2
* ebt
*3121201 0 19250782. 872104. 872104. 1. 0. 1
*3121202 0 19250124. 872104. 872104. 1. 0. 2
2121201 0 13419192. 828592.828592.1.0.1
*hydro
2130000
component name component type
upplen branch
*----------------------------------------------------------------------$
* no. juns vel/flow
2130001 2 0
*hydro area length volume
2130101 0.35 0.5 0.0
*hydro
2130102
*hydro
2130103
horz angle
0.0
roughness
0.0
vert angle
-90.0
hyd diam
0.667558
delta z
-0.5
*hydro ebt pressure tempe
2130200 0 13418526. 822879. 822879. 1.
* from to area Kf Kr efvcahs
2131101 212010000 213000000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0001100
2132101 213010000 214000000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0001100
* velf velg veli '
2131201 1.022885-9 1.022885-9 0. *
2132201 1.917845-8 1.917845-8 0. *
* hyd dia
2131110 0.0
2132110 0.0
beta
0.00
0.00
y-int
1.00
1.00
1.85752-8
2.691416-8
slope
1.00
1.00
2140000 htrcpc pipe
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* no. vols
2140001 10
* vol area
2140101 0.0613274 10
* length
2140301 0.4 10
* volume
2140401 0.0 10
* azim angle
2140501 0.0 10
S* incl angle
2140601 -90.0 10
* roughness hyd dia
2140801 0.0 8.00E-03 10
112~~11~~~~~~~~2-~~~~~~-~-~-------------
* kf kr
2140901 0.0 0.0 9
* pvbfe
2141001 00000 10
* fvcahs
2141101 001000 9
* ebt
2141201 3 1.97E7 773.31
* vel/flow
2141300 1
* liquid vapor int-face
0.0 0. 0. 10
2141301 0.0 0.0 0. 9
*hydro jun diam beta intercept slope jun
2141401 8.00E-03 0.0 1.0 1.0 9
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*hydro
2160000
component name component type
lwrplen branch
*-----------------------------------------------------------------------$
* no. j.
2160001 2
*hydro
2160101
*hydro
2160102
*hydro
2160103
ins vel/flow
area
0.35
horz angle
0.0
roughness
0.0
length
0.5
vert angle
-90.0
hyd diam
0.667558
volume
0.0
delta z
-0.5
fe
0
*hydro ebt
2160200 0
* from
2161101 2
2162101 2
pressure tempe
13452753. 775247. 775247. 1.
to area Kf Kr efvcahs
14010000 216000000 0.0
16010000 217000000 0.0
0.0 0.0 0001100
0.0 0.0 0001100
* velf velg veli
2161201 -2.54965-8 -2.54965-8 0. * -3.85307-8
2162201 -1.513218-9 -1.513218-9 0. * -2.98207-8
* hyd dia
2161110 0.0
2162110 0.0
beta y-int slope
0.00 1.00 1.00
0.00 1.00 1.00
- -== = == == = *
2170000 htrcpc pipe
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* no. vols
2170001 3
* vol area
2170101 0.2 3
* length
2170301 1.0 3
* volume
2170401 0.0 3
* azim angle
2170501 0.0 3
* incl angle
2170601 90.0 3
*1.666666667
* roughness hyd dia
2170801 0.0 0.504627 3
* kf kr
2170901 0.0 0.0 2
* pvbfe
2171001 00000 3
* fvcahs
2171101 001000 2
* ebt
2171201 0 13452511. 775445.
2171202 0 13451545. 775422.
2171203 0 13450579. 775413.
* vel/flow
2171300 0
* liquid vapor int-face
2171301 -1.008844-9 -1.008844-9
2171302 -5.04444-10 -5.04444-10
775445. 1.0. 1
775422. 1.0. 2
775413. 1.0. 3
0. 1 * -1.988044-8
0.2 * -9.94011-9
*hydro jun diam beta intercept slope jun
2171401 0.504627 0.0 1.0 1.0 2
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* turbine bypass valve lx
2240000 outlet valve
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
2240101 217010000 295000000 .1
2240201 0 0. 0. 0. * 0.
2240300 mtrvlv
2240301 1591 591 2.5 0. 206*pass
0.0 0.0 00100
* turbine bypass valve lx
1230000 inlet valve
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
1230101 105010000 112000000 .1
1230201 0 0. 0. 0. * 0.
1230300 mtrvlv
1230301 1582 582 2.5 0. 206
0.0 0.0 00100
1120000 hotductl pipe
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* no. vols
1120001 1
* vol area
1120101 0.2 1
* length
1120301 2.0 1
* volume
1120401 0.0 1
* azim angle
1120501 0.00 1
* incl angle
1120601 90.0 1
* delta z
1120701 2.0 1
* roughness hyd dia
1120801 0.0 0.54627 1
* pvbfe
1121001 00000 1
* fvcahs
*3121101 001000 2
* ebt
*3121201 0
*3121202 0
1121201 0
19250782. 872104. 872104. 1. 0. 1
19250124. 872104. 872104. 1. 0. 2
13419192. 828592. 828592. 1. 0. 1
*hydro
1130000
$
component name component type
upplen branch
*----------------------------------------------------------------------
* no. juns vel/flow
1130001
*hydro
1130101
*hydro
1130102
*hydro
1130103
2 0
area
0.35
horz angle
0.0
roughness
0.0
length
0.5
vert angle
-90.0
hyd diam
0.667558
volume
0.0
delta z
-0.5
fe
*hydro ebt pressure tempe
1130200 0 13418526. 822879. 822879. 1.
i~--------------------------------------
----
* from to area Kf Kr efvcahs
1131101 112010000 113000000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0001100
1132101 113010000 114000000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0001100
* velf velg
1131201 1.022885-9
1132201 1.917845-8
* hyd dia beta
1131110 0.0 0.00
1132110 0.0 0.00
veli
1.022885-9 0. * 1.85752-8
1.917845-8 0. * 2.691416-8
y-int slope
1.00 1.00
1.00 1.00
1140000 htrcpc pipe
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* no. vols
1140001 10
* vol area
1140101 0.0613274 10
* length
1140301 0.4 10
* volume
1140401 0.0 10
* azim angle
1140501 0.0 10
* incl angle
1140601 -90.0 10
* roughness hyd dia
1140801 0.0 8.00E-03 10
* kf kr
1140901 0.0 0.0 9
* pvbfe
1141001 00000 10
* fv
1141101
cahs
001000
* ebt
1141201 3 1.97E7
* vel/flow
1141300 1
* liquid vapo
1141301 0.0 0.
*hydro jun diam
1141401 8.00E-03
773.31 0.0 0. 0. 10
r int-face
0 0. 9
beta intercept slope
0.0 1.0 1.0 9
jun
~l. -------------------------------------
$
*hydro
1160000
component name component type
lwrplen branch
*----------------------------------------------------------------------$
* no. juns vel/flow
1160001 2 0
*hydro area length volume
1160101 0.35 0.5 0.0
*
*hydro horz angle vert angle delta z
1160102 0.0 -90.0 -0.5
*
*hydro roughness hyd diam fe
1160103 0.0 0.667558 0
*
*hydro ebt pressure tempe
1160200 0 13452753. 775247. 775247. 1.
* from to area Kf Kr efvcahs
1161101 114010000 116000000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0001100
1162101 116010000 117000000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0001100
* velf velg veli
1161201 -2.54965-8 -2.54965-8 0. * -3.85307-8
1162201 -1.513218-9 -1.513218-9 0. * -2.98207-8
* hyd dia beta y-int slope
1161110 0.0 0.00 1.00 1.00
1162110 0.0 0.00 1.00 1.00
------------------------------------------------------- 
----
1170000 htrcpc pipe
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* no. vols
1170001 3
* vol area
1170101 0.2 3
* length
1170301 1.0 3 *1.666666667
* volume
1170401 0.0 3
* azim angle
1170501 0.0 3
* incl angle
1170601 90.0 3
* roughness hyd dia
1170801 0.0 0.504627 3
* kf kr
1170901 0.0 0.0 2
* pvbfe
1171001 00000 3
* fvcahs
1171101 001000 2
* ebt
1171201 0 13452511. 775445. 775445. 1.0.
1171202 0 13451545. 775422. 775422. 1.0.
1171203 0 13450579. 775413. 775413. 1.0.
* vel/flow
1171300 0
* liquid vapor int-face
1171301 -1.008844-9 -1.008844-90. 1 * -1.988044-8
1171302 -5.04444-10 -5.04444-10 0. 2 * -9.94011-9
*hydro jun diam
1171401 0.504627
beta intercept slope jun
0.0 1.0 1.0 2
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* turbine bypass valve lx
1240000 outlet valve
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
1240101 117010000 195000000 .1 0.0 0.0 00100
1240201 0 0. 0. 0. * 0.
1240300 mtrvlv
1240301 1592 592 2.5 0. 206
*pass
**
* turbine bypass valve lx
4230000 inlet valve
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
4230101 405010000 412000000 .1
4230201 0 0. 0. 0. * 0.
4230300 mtrvlv
4230301 1596 596 2.5 0. 406
0.0 0.0 00100
4120000 hotductl pipe
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* no. vols
4120001 1
* vol area
4120101 0.2 1
* length
4120301 2.0 1
* volume
4120401 0.0 1
* azim angle
4120501 0.00 1
* incl angle
4120601 90.0 1
* delta z
4120701 2.0 1
;F*
* roughness hyd dia
4120801 0.0 0.54627 1
* pvbfe
4121001 00000 1
* fvcahs
*3121101 001000 2
* ebt
*3121201
*3121202
4121201
19250782. 872104. 872104. 1. 0. 1
19250124. 872104. 872104. 1. 0. 2
13419192. 828592. 828592. 1. 0. 1
'1$
component name component type
upplen branch
*-----------------------------------------------------------------------$
no.
4130001
*hydro
4130101
*hydro
4130102
*hydro
4130103
juns vel/flow
2 0
area
0.35
horz angle
0.0
roughness
0.0
length
0.5
vert angle
-90.0
hyd diam
0.667558
volume
0.0
delta z
-0.5
*hydro ebt pressure tempe
4130200 0 13418526. 822879. 822879. 1.
* from to area Kf
4131101 412010000 413000000
4132101 413010000 414000000
* velf velg veli
4131201 1.022885-9 1.022885-9
4132201 1.917845-8 1.917845-8
* hyd dia
4131110 0.0
4132110 0.0
Kr
0.0
0.0
efvcahs
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0001100
0001100
0. * 1.85752-8
0. * 2.691416-8
beta y-int slope
0.00 1.00 1.00
0.00 1.00 1.00
*== == == == == = == == == == = == == == == == = ==-=== =
4140000 htrcpc pipe
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* no. vols
4140001 10
* vol area
4140101 0.0613274 10
* length
*hydro
4130000
4140301 0.4 10
* volume
4140401 0.0 10
* azim angle
4140501 0.0 10
* incl angle
4140601 -90.0 10
* roughness hyd dia
4140801 0.0 8.00E-03 10
* kf kr
4140901 0.0 0.0 9
* pvbfe
4141001 00000 10
* fvcahs
4141101 001000 9
* ebt
4141201 3 1.97E7 773.31 0.0 0.0. 10
* vel/flow
4141300 1
* liquid vapor int-face
4141301 0.0 0.0 0. 9
*hydro jun diam beta intercept slope jun
4141401 8.00E-03 0.0 1.0 1.0 9
*hydro component name component type
4160000 lwrplen branch
*--------------------------------------------------------------$
no. juns vel/flow
4160001 2 0
*hydro area length volume
4160101 0.35 0.5 0.0
*hydro horz angle vert angle delta z
4160102 0.0 -90.0 -0.5
*
*hydro roughness hyd diam fe
4160103 0.0 0.667558 0
*hydro ebt pressure tempe
4160200 0 13452753. 775247. 775247. 1.
* from to area Kf Kr efvcahs
4161101 414010000 416000000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0001100
4162101 416010000417000000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0001100
* velf velg veli
4161201 -2.54965-8 -2.54965-8 0. * -3.85307-8
4162201 -1.513218-9 -1.513218-9 0. * -2.98207-8
* hyd dia beta y-int slope
4161110 0.0 0.00 1.00 1.00
4162110 0.0 0.00 1.00 1.00
4170000 htrcpc pipe
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* no. vols
4170001 3
* vol area
4170101 0.2 3
* length
4170301 1.0 3 *1.666666667
* volume
4170401 0.0 3
* azim angle
4170501 0.0 3
* incl angle
4170601 90.0 3
* roughness hyd dia
4170801 0.0 0.504627 3
* kf kr
4170901 0.0 0.0 2
* pvbfe
4171001 00000 3
* fvcahs
4171101 001000 2
* ebt
4171201 0 13452511. 775445. 775445. 1.0. 1
4171202 0 13451545. 775422. 775422. 1.0. 2
4171203 0 13450579. 775413. 775413. 1.0. 3
* vel/flow
4171300 0
* liquid vapor int-face
4171301 -1.008844-9 -1.008844-9 0. 1 * -1.988044-8
4171302 -5.04444-10 -5.04444-10 0. 2 * -9.94011-9
*hydro jun diam beta intercept slope jun
4171401 0.504627 0.0 1.0 1.0 2
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* turbine bypass valve lx
4240000 outlet valve
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
4240101 417010000 495000000 .1 0.0 0.0 00100
4240201 0 0. 0. 0. * 0.
4240300 mtrvlv
4240301 1599 599 2.5 0. 406
* Beginning of the C02 side model
==*=====-- -- -- - -- -- -- - -- -- -- -
3000000 source tmdpvol
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* area length volume
3000101 0.9 100.0 0.0
* azim angle incl angle delta z
3000102 0.00 0.0 0.0
* roughness hyd dia pvbfe
3000103 0.00000 0.0 00010 *1.07047
* ebt trip search var
3000200 003 301
* indep var
3000201 0.00 19.25e6 820.85 *
3000202 1.00 19.25e6 820.85 *
3010000 makeup tmdpjun
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* from to area
3010101 305010000 300000000 0.0
* vel/flow trip search var
3010200 1 *301 cntrlvar 301
* indep var
3010201 0.0 0.0 3189.1 0.0
3010202 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
3010203 100. 0.0 0.0 0.0
*------------------------------------------------------------------
3600000 source tmdpvol
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* area length volume
3600101 0.9 10000. 0.0
* azim angle incl angle delta z
3600102 0.00 0.0 0.0
* roughness hyd dia pvbfe
3600103 0.00000 0.0000 00010
* ebt trip search var
3600200 003 0
* indep var
100
3600201 0.00 19.80e6 669.25
3700000 inlet tmdpjun
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
*hydro from to area
3700101 360000000 395000000 0.9
* vel/flow trip search var
3700200 1 0
* indep var
3700201 0.0 0.0 3189.1 0.0
3700202 0.5 0.0 0. 0.0
3700203 100.0 0.0 0. 0.0
2000000 source tmdpvol
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* area length volume
2000101 0.9 100.0 0.0
* azim angle incl angle delta z
2000102 0.00 0.0 0.0
* roughness hyd dia pvbfe
2000103 0.00000 0.0 00010 *1.07047
* ebt trip search var
2000200 003 301
* indep var
2000201 0.00 19.25e6 820.85 *
2000202 1.00 19.25e6 820.85 *
*------------------------------------------------------ ----
2010000 makeup tmdpjun
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* from to area
2010101 205010000 200000000 0.0
* vel/flow trip search var
2010200 1 *301 cntrlvar 301
* indep var
2010201 0.0 0.0 3189.1 0.0
2010202 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
2010203 100. 0.0 0.0 0.0
2600000 source tmdpvol
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------area length volume
* area length volume
101
2600101 0.9 10000. 0.0
* azim angle incl angle delta z
2600102 0.00 0.0 0.0
* roughness hyd dia pvbfe
2600103 0.00000 0.0000 00010
* ebt trip search var
2600200 003 0
* indep var
2600201 0.00 19.80e6 669.25
2700000 inlet tmdpjun
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
*hydro from to area
2700101 260000000 295000000 0.9
* vel/flow trip search var
2700200 1 0
* indep var
2700201 0.0 0.0 3189.1 0.0
2700202 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
2700203 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
****======= === == =-----------==== -= -== === -=
1000000 source tmdpvol
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* area length volume
1000101 0.9 100.0 0.0
* azim angle incl angle delta z
1000102 0.00 0.0 0.0
* roughness hyd dia pvbfe
1000103 0.00000 0.0 00010 *1.07047
* ebt trip search var
1000200 003 301
* indep var
1000201 0.00 19.25e6 820.85 *
1000202 1.00 19.25e6 820.85 *
1010000 makeup tmdpjun
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* from to area
1010101 105010000 100000000 0.0
* vel/flow trip search var
1010200 1 *301 cntrlvar 301
* indep var
1010201 0.0 0.0
1010202 0.5 0.0
1010203 100. 0.0
3189.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0 0.0
1600000 source tmdpvol
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* area
1600101 0.9
* azim angl
1600102 0.00
* roughness
1600103 0.000(
* ebt tri
1600200 003
* indep var
1600201 0.00
length
10000.
incl angle
volume
0.0
delta z
0.0 0.0
hyd dia pvbfe
00 0.0000 00010
p search var
0
19.80e6 669.25
,Ic----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1700000 inlet tmdpjun
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
*hydro from to
1700101 160000000
* vel/flow trip
1700200 1 0
* indep var
1700201 0.0 0.0
1700202 0.5
1700203 100.0
0.0 0
0.0
area
195000000
search var
3189.1 0.0
0.9
).0 0.0
0.0 0.0
*--
******===----=------------------------------------------------------------------------
4000000 source tmdpvol
* ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ *
area
4000101 0.9
* azim angle
4000102 0.00
* roughness
4000103 0.00000
* ebt trip
4000200 003
* indep var
length
100.0
incl angle
0.0
hyd dia
0.0
search var
volume
0.0
delta z
0.0
pvbfe
00010 *1.07047
301
4000201 0.00 19.25e6 820.85 *
4000202 1.00 19.25e6 820.85 *
102
*=======================================
103
4010000 makeup tmdpjun
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* from to area
4010101 405010000 400000000 0.0
* vel/flow trip search var
4010200 1 *301 cntrlvar 301
* indep var
4010201 0.0 0.0 3189.1 0.0
4010202 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
4010203 100. 0.0 0.0 0.0
* *--------------------------------------------------------------------
4600000 source tmdpvol
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* area length volume
4600101 0.9 10000. 0.0
* azim angle incl angle delta z
4600102 0.00 0.0 0.0
* roughness hyd dia pvbfe
4600103 0.00000 0.0000 00010
* ebt trip search var
4600200 003 0
* indep var
4600201 0.00 19.80e6 669.25
* -------------------------------------
4700000 inlet tmdpjun
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
*hydro from to area
4700101 460000000 495000000 0.9
* vel/flow trip search var
4700200 1 0
* indep var
4700201 0.0 0.0 3189.1 0.0
4700202 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
4700203 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
****************************** STRUCTURE 3141 ******************
*ht str ht.strs m.pts geom init 1.coord refl b.vol
11141000 10 5 2 1 0.005280844 0
* loc flag
11141100 0
* # r
11141101 4
* compos.
11141201 3
* source
11141301 0.0
0.0070
* temperature flag
11141400 0
* temperature #
11141401 700.00 5
* vol inc type code
11141501 114010000 10000 160
* vol inc type code
11141601 960010000 10000 111
*
* type
11141701 0
mult
0.0
D-lt
0.0
D-rt
0.0
11141800 1
* Dhe LHEf
11141801 0.0 10.0
11141802 0.0 10.0
11141803 0.0 10.0
11141900 1
* Dhe LHEf
11141901 0.0 10.0
LHEr
10.0
10.0
10.0
LHEr
10.0
LGSf LGSr Kfwd Krev Fboi
10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.0 3.0
10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.0 3.0
10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.0 3.0
nclf povd ff #
1. 1
1. 5
1. 10
LGSf LGSr Kfwd Krev Fbo
10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0
****************************** STRUCTURE 3141 ******************
*--------------------------- ---------------------------------
*ht str ht.strs m.pts geom init 1.coord refl b.vol
12141000 10 5 2 1 0.005280844 0
* loc flag
12141100 0 1
104
factor
1
factor
1
280. 10
280. 10
# *sour
10
12141101 4 0.0070
* compos. #
12141201 3
*
* source #
12141301 0.0
* temperature flag
12141400 0
* temperature #
12141401 700.00 5
* vol inc
12141501 214011
type code
0000 10000 160
* vol inc type code
12141601 961010000 10000 111
* type mult
12141701 0 0.0
D-lt
0.0
D-rt
0.0
factor
1
factor
1
# *sour
10
12141800 1
* Dhe LHEf
12141801 0.0 10.0
12141802 0.0 10.0
12141803 0.0 10.0
12141900 1
* Dhe LHEf
12141901 0.0 10.0
LHEr
10.0
10.0
10.0
LGSf LGSr Kfwd Krev Fboi
10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.0 3.0
10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.0 3.0
10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.0 3.0
nclf povd ff #
1. 1
1. 5
1. 10
LHEr LGSf LGSr Kfwd Krev Fbo
10.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 10
***************************** STRUCTURE 3141 ******************
*ht str ht.strs m.pts
13141000 10 5
* loc
13141100
geom init 1.coord refl b.vol
2 1 0.005280844 0
flag
* # r
13141101 4
* compos.
0.0070
105
280. 10
280. 10
106
13141201 3 4
*
* source #
13141301 0.0 4
* temperature flag
13141400 0
*
* temperature #
13141401 700.00 5
* vol inc type code factor
13141501 314010000 10000 160 1 280. 10
* vol inc type code factor
13141601 962010000 10000 111 1 280. 10
* type mult D-lt D-rt # *sour
13141701 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10
13141800 1
* Dhe LHEf LHEr LGSf LGSr Kfwd Krev Fboi nclf povd ff #
13141801 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.0 3.0 1. 1
13141802 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.0 3.0 1. 5
13141803 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.0 3.0 1. 10
*
13141900 1
* Dhe LHEf LHEr LGSf LGSr Kfwd Krev Fbo
13141901 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 10
***************************** STRUCTURE 3141 ******************
*
*---------------------------------------------------------
*ht str ht.strs m.pts geom init 1.coord refl b.vol
14141000 10 5 2 1 0.005280844 0
*
* loc flag
14141100 0 1
* # r
14141101 4 0.0070
* compos. #
14141201 3 4
* source #
107
14141301 0.0 4
* temperature flag
14141400 0
* temperature #
14141401 700.00 5
*
* vol inc
14141501 41401
type code
0000 10000 160
* vol inc type code
14141601 963010000 10000 111
* type
14141701
mult D-lt D-rt
0 0.0 0.0 0.0
factor
1
factor
1
# *sour
10
14141800 1
* Dhe LHEf
14141801 0.0 10.0
14141802 0.0 10.0
14141803 0.0 10.0
14141900 1
* Dhe LHEf
14141901 0.0 10.0
LHEr
10.0
10.0
10.0
LHEr
10.0
LGSfLGSr Kfwd Krev Fboi nclfpovd ff #
10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.0 3.0 1. 1
10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.0 3.0 1. 5
10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.0 3.0 1. 10
LGSf LGSr Kfwd Krev Fbo
10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0
* approximate scram curve with 1 s delay
20299000 reac-t 501
20299001 0.0 0.0
20299002 1.0 0.0
20299003 1.5 -0.2
20299004 2.0 -0.5
20299005 2.5 -3.0
20299006 3.0 -8.4$====================
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* decay power based on eugene's calculations for new core
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
20270600 power 510 1.0 1.0
* time p/po
20270601 -1.0 0.0
280. 10
280. 10
108
20270602
20270603
20270604
20270605
20270606
20270607
20270608
20270609
20270610
20270611
20270612
20270613
20270614
20270615
20270616
20270617
20270618
20270619
20270620
20270621
20270622
20270623
20270624
20270625
20270626
20270627
20270628
20270629
20270630
20270631
20270632
20270633
20270634
20270635
20270636
20270637
20270638
20270639
* -
30000000 point separabl
* fp-decay power rinit beta/lambda fp-y u239-y G-factor
30000001 gamma 2400.e6 -1.0e-60 666.67 1.0 1.e-60 0.
0.1 0.0589144
1.0 0.0551549
1.5 0.0536907
2.0 0.0524328
4.0 0.0487971
6.0 0.0464603
8.0 0.0447893
10.0 0.0435018
15.0 0.0411928
20.0 0.0395791
40.0 0.0357397
60.0 0.0334909
80.0 0.0319063
100.0 0.0307046
150.0 0.0286318
200.0 0.0272649
400.0 0.0242200
600.0 0.0224554
800.0 0.0211546
1000.0 0.0201120
1500.0 0.0181624
2000.0 0.0167732
4000.0 0.0137039
6000.0 0.0122575
8000.0 0.0114053
10000.0 0.0108279
15000.0 0.0099174
20000.0 0.0093461
40000.0 0.0080769
60000.0 0.0073531
80000.0 0.0068500
100000.0 0.0064680
150000.0 0.0057910
200000.0 0.0053224
400000.0 0.0042407
600000.0 0.0036697
800000.0 0.0033155
1000000.0 0.0030754
* fp-type
*30000002 ans79-3 200. 0.0 0.0
*
30000011
30000012
30000013
990 * scram curve
10506 * radial expansion
10508 * crd expansion
* Coolant density coefficient
* density reactivity
*30000501 8707.2 0.5984605
*30000502 9533.7 0.6315505
*30000503 10073.6 0.00
*30000504 10155.6 -0.0959595
*30000505 10276.1 -0.2369395
**30000506 10593. 0.1663 *
density reactivity
30000501 7347.2 -7.6162502
30000502 9017.60
30000503 9574.40
30000504 9797.12
30000505 9852.80
30000506 9908.48
30000507 9964.16
30000508 10019.84
30000509 10041.00
30000510 10055.48
30000511 10078.86
30000512 10092.22
30000513 10103.36
30000514 10110.04
30000515 10136.77
30000516 10156.81
30000517 10186.88
30000518 10242.56
30000519 10298.24
30000520 10353.92
**
-0.4459169
0.1924165
0.2025009
0.1831248
0.1549898
0.1180959
0.0724432
0.0527985
0.0386287
0.0144883
0.0000000
-0.0124589
-0.0201025
-0.0519379
-0.0771388
-0.1170685
-0.1977569
-0.2872041
-0.3854102
* trancalc
* trancalc
*cliff for LBE
* trancalc -8.366
* trancalc 0.527
* trancalc 0.879
* trancalc 0.703
* trancalc 0.0
extrapolated * trancalc -0.102
* trancalc
* trancalc
* trancalc
* trancalc
* trancalc
* trancalc
* trancalc
* trancalc
* trancalc
* trancalc
* trancalc
* trancalc
* trancalc
* trancalc
* trancalc
* trancalc
* trancalc
* trancalc
* trancalc
* trancalc
-0.3854102
-7.6162502
-0.4459169
0.1924165
0.2025009
0.1831248
0.1549898
0.1180959
0.0724432
0.0527985
0.0386287
0.0144883
0.0000000
-0.0124589
-0.0201025
-0.0519379
-0.0771388
-0.1170685
-0.1977569
-0.2872041
* Doppler =-0. 111 c/K -as calculated by ES, ae=-0. 117 c/K
* temp reactivity (includes thermal expansion)
*30000601 300. 0.0 * trancalc
*30000602 1154. -1.94712 * trancalc -1.05042
*30000603 1873.15 -3.586782 * extrapolated * trancalc -1.93497
*
* New Doppler 4.408620E-09x2-1.198005E-05x+0.02755847 + thermal expansion
30000601 300.00 0.0
30000602 400.00 -0.364056
30000603 600.00 -1.018691
1.0
109
900.00 -1.816951
1000.00 -2.034053
1200.00 -2.39478
1500.00 -2.752178
1600.00 -2.822326
1800.00 -2.889145
510010000
510020000
510030000
510040000
510050000
516010000
516020000
516030000
516040000
516050000
30000701
30000702
30000703
30000704
30000705
30000706
30000707
30000708
30000709
30000710
30000801
30000802
30000803
30000804
30000805
30000806
30000807
30000808
30000809
30000810
) 0.1454887
) 0.2473204
0.3330110
0.1986532
0.0753286
0.0000288
0.0000490
0.0000660
0.0000394
0.0000149
0.1454887
0.2473204
0.3330110
0.1986532
0.0753286
0.0000288
0.0000490
0.0000660
0.0000394
0.0000149
* compute tfuel, tmod, and rhomod to check reactivity feedback
* use power squared weighting
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*ctlvar name type factor init fc min max
20505000 rhomod sum 1.0 10089.6 1
*
*ctlvar aO al vl pl
20505001 0.0 0.1454887 rho
20505002 0.3330110 rho
20505003 0.0753286 rho
20505004 0.0000490 rho
20505005 0.0000394 rho
*ctlvar name type factor
20505020 tmod sum 1.0
a2 v2 p2
510030000 0.2473204 rho 510040000
510050000 0.1986532 rho 510060000
510070000 0.0000288 rho 516030000
516040000 0.0000660 rho 516050000
516060000 0.0000149 rho 516070000
init fc min max
798.15 1
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30000604
30000605
30000606
30000607
30000608
30000609
5101001
5101002
5101003
5101004
5101005
5161001
5161002
5161003
5161004
5161005
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
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*ctlvar aO al vl pl a2 v2 p2
20505021 0.0 0.1454887 tempf 510030000 0.2473204 tempf 510040000
20505022 0.3330110 tempf 510050000 0.1986532 tempf 510060000
20505023 0.0753286 tempf 510070000 0.0000288 tempf 516030000
20505024 0.0000490 tempf 516040000 0.0000660 tempf 516050000
20505025 0.0000394 tempf 516060000 0.0000149 tempf 516070000
*
*ctlvar name type
20505040 tfuel sum
factor
1.0
*ctlvar aO al vl pl
20505041 0.0 0.1454887 htvat
20505042 0.3330110 htvat
20505043 0.0753286 htvat
20505044 0.0000490 htvat
20505045 0.0000394 htvat
init fc min max
954.9 1
a2 v2 p2
5101001 0.2473204 htvat 5101002
5101003 0.1986532 htvat 5101004
5101005 0.0000288 htvat 5161001
5161002 0.0000660 htvat 5161003
5161004 0.0000149 htvat 5161005
* radial expansion feedback coefficient = -0.00135$/deg C; control on
* average moderator temperature (-0.0023$/deg C used by Cliff)
* crd expansion feedback coefficient = 0.0 $/deg C$====================
*ctlvar name type factor init fc min max
*20505050 tmodexp sum 1.0 792.975 1
20505050 tmodexp sum 1.0 798.15 1
*
* Cliff
*ctlvar aO
20505051 0.0
20505052
20505053
*
al vl pl a2 v2 p2
0.20 tempf 510030000 0.20 tempf 510040000
0.20 tempf 510050000 0.20 tempf 510060000
0.20 tempf 510070000
*ctlvar name type factor init fc min
20505060 radexp sum 1.0 -1.0775025 1
*20505060 radexp sum 1.0 -1.83575 1
*
*ctlvar aO al vl p1 a2 v2 p2
20505061 0.0 -0.00135 cntrlvar 505
*20505061 0.0 -0.0023 cntrlvar 505
*ctlvar name type factor init fc min
20505080 crdexp constant 0.0
*
max
max
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* maximum clad temperature for transient limit; based on inner surface
*ctlvar name type factor init fc min max
20501010 mtclad stdfnctn 1.0 903.11 1
*ctlvar type vl pl v2 p2
20501011 max httemp 516100107 httemp 516100207
20501012 httemp 516100307 httemp 516100407
20501013 httemp 516100507
*ctlvar name type factor init fc min max
20501020 tclad sum 1.0 629.96 1
*ctlvar aO al vi pl a2 v2 p2
20501021 -273.15 1.0 cntrlvar 101
*ctlvar name type factor init fc min max
20501030 maxclad stdfnctn 1.0 647.63 1
*ctlvar type vl pl v2 p2
20501031 max cntrlvar 102 cntrlvar 103
*ctlvar name type factor init fc min max
20501040 terr sum 1.0 20.04 1
*ctlvar aO al vl pl a2 v2 p2
20501041 0.0 1.0 cntrlvar 100 -1.0 cntrlvar 102 * fpsscalc
*
*ctlvar name type factor init fc min max
*20507060 corepow integral 5.e5 0.0 03 0.0 4000.e6
*ctlvar vl pl
*20507061 cntrlvar 704
*20507060 corepow constant 6.5e6 * dpsscalc
*ctlvar name type factor init fc min max
20501050 tabdecy function 2400.e6 0. 00
20501051 time 0 706
*ctlvar name type factor init fc min max
20501060 decayp stdfnctn 1.0 131182320. 00
*
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20501061 max cntrlvar 105 rkgapow 0
20501070 core-w sum 1.0 2.4+9 1
*ctlvar a0 al vl pl a2 v2 p2
20501071 0.0 1.0 rkfipow 0 1.0 cntrlvar 106
*ctlvar name type factor init fc min max
20501080 pramp sum 1.0 1.+9 1 2 1000.e6 * fpsscal
*
*ctlvar a0 al vI pl a2 v2 p2
20501081 0.0 1000.e5 time 0 *fpsscalc
*
*ctlvar name type factor init fc min max
20501100 fpower stdfnctn 1.0 2.4+9 1 0
20501101 min cntrlvar 107 cntrlvar 107
*
*ctlvar name type factor init fc min max
20501120 core-mw sum 1.0e-6 2400. 1
*ctlvar aO al vl pl a2 v2 p2
20501121 0.0 1.0 cntrlvar 110
* factor = 1/(hg - hfw); trying for 200 c superheat
*ctlvar name type factor init fc min max
*20507140 mfw sum 4.54965e-7 333.2525 1
*20507140 mfw sum 4.73164e-7 0.0 1 *fpsscal
*20507140 mfw sum 4.77713e-7 0.0 1 *fpsscal
*20507140 mfw sum 4.76075e-7 333.2525 1
*
*ctlvar aO al vl pl a2 v2 p2
*20507141 0.0 1.0 cntrlvar 710 *fpsscal
*********************************** RVACS
******************************** RVACS
8000000 supply tmdpvol
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* area length volume
8000101 1.e5 1.0 0.0
* azim angle incl angle delta z
114
8000102 0.00 -90.0 -1.0
* roughness hyd dia pvbfe
8000103 0.00000 0.0000 00010
* ebt trip search var
8000200 004 0
* indep var
8000201 0.00 1.e5 298.15 0.0
*8000000 supply tmdpvol
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* area length volume
*8000101 13.823 20.0 0.0
* azim angle incl angle delta z
*8000102 0.00 -90.0 -20.0
* roughness hyd dia pvbfe
*8000103 4.572e-5 0.8 00010
* ebt trip search var
*8000200 004 0
* indep var
*8000201 0.00 1.e5 310.93 0.0
*hydro component name component type
8050000 inlet sngljun
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
*hydro from to area floss r loss vcahs
8050101 800010000 810000000 29.6566 0.5 1.0 01000
*hydro vel/flw f flowrate g flowrate j flowrate
8050201 0 2.415627 2.415627 0. * 83.7017
*hydro dhjun beta c m
8050110 1.6 0.0 1.0 1.0
*----------------------------------------------------- ------
8100000 dwncmr pipe
* no. vols
8100001 15
* vol area
8100101 29.6566 15 *-AN
* length
8100301 1.0 1
8100302 1.0 11
8100303 1.3 13 *-AN
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8100304 1.30 14
8100305 1.50 15
* volume
8100401 0.0 15
* azim angle
8100501 0.00 15
* incl angle
8100601 -90.0 15
* delta z
8100701 -1.0 1
8100702 -1.0 11
8100703 -1.3 13
8100704 -1.30 14
8100705 -1.50 15
* roughness hyd dia
8100801 4.572e-5 1.6 15
* pvbfe
8101001 00000 15
* fvcahs
8101101 001000 14
* ebt
8101201 6 100000.6
8101202 6 100012.
8101203 6 100023.4
8101204 6 100034.8
8101205 6 100046.2
8101206 6 100057.6
8101207 6 100069.
8101208 6 100080.3
8101209 6 100091.6
8101210 6 100103.
8101211 6 100114.3
8101212 6 100127.3
8101213 6 100142.
8101214 6 100156.8
8101215 6 100172.6
372429. 372429. 1. 1. 1
372577.5 372577.5 1. 1. 2
372759. 372759. 1. 1. 3
372950. 372950. 1. 1. 4
373134. 373134. 1. 1. 5
373339.6 373339.6 1. 1. 6
373535. 373535. 1. 1. 7
373720. 373720. 1. 1. 8
373894.4 373894.4 1. 1. 9
374059. 374059. 1. 1. 10
374213. 374213. 1. 1. 11
374398.5 374398.5 1. 1. 12
374567. 374567. 1. 1. 13
374718. 374718. 1. 1. 14
374868. 374868. 1. 1. 15
* vel/flow
8101300 0
* liquid vapor int-face
8101301 2.41721 2.41721 0. 1 * 83.7017
8101302 2.4186 2.4186 0. 2 * 83.7017
8101303 2.42037 2.42037 0. 3 * 83.7017
8101304 2.42224 2.42224 0. 4 * 83.7017
8101305 2.424035 2.424035 0. 5 * 83.7017
8101306 2.426067 2.426067 0. 6 * 83.7016
8101307 2.427984 2.427984 0. 7 * 83.7016
2.42979 2.42979 0. 8 * 83.7016
2.431477 2.431477 0. 9 * 83.7016
2.43305 2.43305 0. 10 * 83.7016
2.434506 2.434506 0. 11 * 83.7016
2.436273 2.436273 0. 12 * 83.7016
2.43781 2.43781 0. 13 * 83.7016
2.439142 2.439142 0. 14 * 83.7016
jun
1.6 0.0 1.0 1.0 14
'F - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - -
======== == - 'F=
component name component type
turn sngljun
* *
from to
810010000
area f loss
820000000 0.0
r loss vcahs
0.327 0.327 01000
*hydro vel/flw
8150201 0
*hydro dhjun
8150110 0.5
f flowrate g flowrate
5.7248 5.7248
beta
0.0
c
1.0
m
1.0
8200000 riser pipe
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
* no. vols
8200001 15
* vol area
8200101 12.6424 15
* length
8200301 1.50
8200302 1.30
8200303 1.3
8200304 1.00
8200305 1.00
* volume
8200401 0.0
* azim angle
8200501 0.00
* incl angle
8200601 90.0
* delta z
8200701 1.50
8200702 1.30
1
2
4
14
15
15
8101308
8101309
8101310
8101311
8101312
8101313
8101314
8101402
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*hydro
8150000
*hydro
8150101
j flowrate
0. * 83.7016
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8200703 1.3 4
8200704 1.00 14
8200705 1.00 15
* roughness hyd dia
8200801 4.572e-5 0.475 15
* pvbfe
8201001 00000 15
* fvcahs
8201101 001000 14
100150.8
100133.5
100117.8
100102.5
100089.
100077.6
100066.4
100055.:
100044.3
100033.4
100022.8
100012.3
100002.
99992.
99982.1
381796.
387765.
393644.
399432.
403830.
408175.
412466.
2 416703.
420887.
425024.
428010.
430921.
433128.
433005.
432898.
* vel/flow
8201300 0
* liquid vapor int-face
8201301 5.90844 5.90844 (
8201302 6.06643 6.06643 (
8201303 6.22183 6.22183 (
8201304 6.37469 6.37469 (
8201305 6.49085 6.49085 (
8201306 6.60544 6.60544 (
8201307 6.71854 6.71854 (
8201308 6.83015 6.83015 (
8201309 6.94028 6.94028 (
8201310 7.04912 7.04912 (
8201311 7.12791 7.12791 (
8201312 7.20479 7.20479 (
8201313 7.26323 7.26323 (
8201314 7.26087 7.26087 (
0.475
381796.
387765.
393644.
4 399432.4
403830.
408175.
412466.
416703.
420887.
425024.
428010.
4 430921.4
433128.
433005. 1
432898.
1. 1. 1
1. 1. 2
1. 1. 3
1. 1. 4
1. 1. 5
1. 1. 6
1. 1. 7
1. 1. 8
1. 1. 9
1. 1. 10
1. 1. 11
1. 1. 12
1. 1. 13
.1. 14
1. 1. 15
83.7016
83.7016
83.7016
83.7016
83.7016
83.7016
83.7016
83.7016
83.7016
* 83.7016
* 83.7026
* 83.7042
* 83.7058
* 83.7069
jun
0.0 1.0 1.0 14
* ebt
8201201
8201202
8201203
8201204
8201205
8201206
8201207
8201208
8201209
8201210
8201211
8201212
8201213
8201214
8201215
8201402
*
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*hydro component name component type
8250000 outlet sngljun
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
*hydro from to area floss r loss vcahs
8250101 820010000 830000000 12.6424 0.0 0.0 01000
*
*hydro
8250201
*hydro
8250110
vel/flw
0
dhjun
0.475
f flowrate
7.25881
beta
0.0
g flowrate j flowrate
7.25881 0. * 83.7073
c m
1.0 1.0
8300000 sink tmdpvol
* ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ *
* area
8300101 56.
* azim angle
8300102 0.00
* roughness
8300103 0.00000
* ebt trip
8300200 004 4
* indep var
length
20.0
incl angle
90.0
hyd dia
4.2000
search var
rolume
0.0
delta z
20.0
pvbfe
00010
8300201 0.00 1.e5 310.93 0.0
**************************** STRUCTURE 8201
* reactor and containment vessel walls; gap filled with lead bismuth
*ht str ht.strs m.pts geom init 1.coord refl b.vol ax.incr.
18201000 16 13 2 1 4.920E+00 0
*
* loc
18201100
* #
18201101
18201102
18201103
*
flag
4.970E+00
5.000
5.100
-r compos.
18201201 3
*---------------------------------------- --------------------- -
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18201202 6 6
18201203 3 12
* source #
18201301 0.0 12
* temperature flag
18201400 0
*
* temperature #
18201401 600.00 13
*
* vol inc
18201501 500010000
18201502 580010000
18201503 580020000
18201504 580040000
18201505 580140000
type c
0
0
10000
10000
10000
* vol inc type c
18201601 820010000
18201602 820020000
18201603 820030000
18201604 820050000
18201605 820150000
* type mult
18201701 0 0.0
0
0
10000
10000
0
D-lt
0.0
ode
1
1
factor #
1 1.500
1 1.300
1 1.300
1 1.000
1 0.500
rode factor #
1 1 1.500
1 1 1.300
1 1 1.300
1 1 1.000
1 1 0.500
D-rt
0.0
# *source
16
18201800 1
* Dhe LHEf
18201801 0.0 10.
18201802 0.0 10.
*
LHEr LGSf LGSr
10. 10. 10. 0.0
10. 10. 10. 0.0
Kfwd Krev Fboil nclf povd ff #
0.0 1.0 1.50 1.0 1.0 1
0.0 1.0 14.90 1.0 1.0 16
18201900 1
* Dhe LHEf LHEr LGSf LGSr Kfwd Krev Fboil nclfpovd ff #
182019010.0 10. 10. 10. 10. 0.0 0.0 1.0 16.4 1.0 2.5 16
**************************** STRUCTURE 8202
* collector cylinder wall
*ht str ht.strs m.pts geom init 1.coord refl b.vol ax.incr.
18202000 16 5 2 1 5.490 0
*
* loc
18202100
flag
0
* # r
18202101 4
*18202102 1
* compos.
18202201 3
*18202202 5
*
* source #
18202301 0.0
5.500
3.604325
*asbestos
* temperature flag
18202400 0
* temperature #
18202401 600.00 5
inc type c
820010000 0
820020000 0
820030000 10000
820050000 10000
820150000 0
ode factor #
1 1 1.50
1 1 1.30
1 1 1.300
1 1 1.00
1 1 0.50
* vol inc type code factor #
18202601 810150000 0 1 1 1.50
18202602 810140000 0 1 1 1.30
18202603 810130000 -10000 1 1 1.300
18202604 810110000 -10000 1 1 1.00
18202605 810010000 0 1 1 0.50
* type mult D-lt D-rt
18202701 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
18202800 1
* Dhe LHEf LHEr LGSf LGSr
18202801 0.0 10. 10. 10. 10. 0.0
# *source
16
Kfwd Krev Fboil nclf povd ff #
0.0 1.0 16.4 1.0 2.0 16
18202900 1
* Dhe LHEf LHEr LGSf LGSr Kfwd Krev Fboil nclf povd ff #
182029010.0 10. 10. 10. 10. 0.0 0.0 1.0 16.4 1.0 1.0 16
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* vol
18202501
18202502
18202503
18202504
18202505
121
**************************** STRUCTURE 8203
* perforated plate
*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
*ht str ht.strs m.pts
18203000 16 3
* loc
18203100
*18203101
18203101
geom init 1.coord refl b.vol ax.incr.
2 1 5.290 0
flag
0
r
2 5.300
* compos.
18203201 3
* source
18203301 0.0
* temperature flag
18203400 0
* temperature #
18203401 600.00 3
* vol
18203501
18203502
18203503
18203504
18203505
inc type c
820010000 0
820020000 0
820030000 10000
820050000 10000
820150000 0
ode factor #
1 1 0.90
1 1 0.78
1 1 0.78
1 1 0.60
1 1 0.30
* vol inc type code factor #
18203601 820010000 0 1 1 0.90
18203602 820020000 0 1 1 0.78
18203603 820030000 10000 1 1 0.78
18203604 820050000 10000 1 1 0.60
18203605 820150000 0 1 1 0.30
* type
18203701
*
mult
0 0.0
D-lt D-rt
0.0 0.0
1
2
4
14
16
1
2
4
14
16
# *source
16
18203800 1
* Dhe LHEf LHEr LGSf LGSr Kfwd Krev Fboil nclf povd ff #
182038010.0 10. 10. 10. 10. 0.0 0.0 1.0 16.4 1.0 2.0 16
122
18203900 1
* Dhe LHEf LHEr LGSf LGSr Kfwd Krev Fboil nclfpovd ff #
182039010.0 10. 10. 10. 10. 0.0 0.0 1.0 16.4 1.0 2.0 16
**************************** radiation ********************************
* nset
60000000 16
* from outer wall of containment vessel to inner wall of collector
* nrh trmin alpha set
60100000 4 273. 0.0
* htnum jlr emis
60101001 8201001 1 0.75
60102001 8203001 0 0.75
60103001 8203001 1 0.75
60104001 8202001 0 0.75
*
* 1 view factor
60101101 0.0
60101102 0.60
60101103 0.0
60101104 0.40
*2
60102101 0.9640
60102102 0.0359
60102103
60102104
*3
60103101
60103102
60103103
60103104
*4
60104101
60104102
60104103
60104104
*
surface
1 * F-1
2 *F1-2
3 *F1-3
4 *F1-4
83
17
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.0
0.371585
0.0 2
0.579235
0.049180
1 * F2-1
2 * F2-2
* F2-3
* F2-4
* F3-1
* F3-2
* F3-3
* F3-4
1 * F4-1
* F4-2
3 * F4-3
4 *F4-4
* nrh trmin alpha set
60200000 4 273. 0.0 01
* htnum jlr emis
60201001 8201002 1 0.75
60202001 8203002 0 0.75
60203001 8203002 1 0.75
123
60204001 8202002 0 0.75
* nrh trmin alpha set
60300000 4 273. 0.0 01
* htnum jlr emis
60301001 8201003 1 0.75
60302001 8203003 0 0.75
60303001 8203003 1 0.75
60304001 8202003 0 0.75
* nrh trmin alpha set
60400000 4 273. 0.0 01
* htnum jlr emis
60401001 8201004 1 0.75
60402001 8203004 0 0.75
60403001 8203004 1 0.75
60404001 8202004 0 0.75
* nrh trmin alpha set
60500000 4 273. 0.0 01
* htnum jlr emis
60501001 8201005 1 0.75
60502001 8203005 0 0.75
60503001 8203005 1 0.75
60504001 8202005 0 0.75
* nrh trmin alpha set
60600000 4 273. 0.0 01
* htnum jlr emis
60601001 8201006 1 0.75
60602001 8203006 0 0.75
60603001 8203006 1 0.75
60604001 8202006 0 0.75
* nrh trmin alpha set
60700000 4 273. 0.0 01
* htnum jlr emis
60701001 8201007 1 0.75
60702001 8203007 0 0.75
60703001 8203007 1 0.75
60704001 8202007 0 0.75
* nrh trmin alpha set
60800000 4 273. 0.0 01
* htnum jlr emis
60801001 8201008 1 0.75
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60802001 8203008 0 0.75
60803001 8203008 1 0.75
60804001 8202008 0 0.75
* nrh trmin alpha set
60900000 4 273. 0.0 01
* htnum jlr emis
60901001 8201009 1 0.75
60902001 8203009 0 0.75
60903001 8203009 1 0.75
60904001 8202009 0 0.75
* nrh trmin alpha set
61000000 4 273. 0.0 01
* htnum jlr emis
61001001 8201010 1 0.75
61002001 8203010 0 0.75
61003001 8203010 1 0.75
61004001 8202010 0 0.75
* nrh trmin alpha set
61100000 4 273. 0.0 01
* htnum jlr emis
61101001 8201011 1 0.75
61102001 8203011 0 0.75
61103001 8203011 1 0.75
61104001 8202011 0 0.75
* nrh trmin alpha set
61200000 4 273. 0.0 01
* htnum jlr emis
61201001 8201012 1 0.75
61202001 8203012 0 0.75
61203001 8203012 1 0.75
61204001 8202012 0 0.75
* nrh trmin alpha set
61300000 4 273. 0.0 01
* htnum jlr emis
61301001 8201013 1 0.75
61302001 8203013 0 0.75
61303001 8203013 1 0.75
61304001 8202013 0 0.75
* nrh trmin alpha set
61400000 4 273. 0.0 01
* htnum jlr emis
61401001 8201014 1
61402001 8203014 0
61403001 8203014 1
61404001 8202014 0
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
* nrh trmin alpha set
61500000 4 273. 0.0 01
* htnum jlr emis
61501001 8201015 1
61502001 8203015 0
61503001 8203015 1
61504001 8202015 0
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
* nrh trmin alpha set
61600000 4 273. 0.0 01
* htnum jlr emis
61601001 8201016 1 0.75
61602001 8203016 0 0.75
61603001 8203016 1 0.75
61604001 8202016 0 0.75
**ctlvar name type factor init fc min max
20507210 anna stdfnctn 1.0 873. 1
*
*ctlvar type v1 pl v2
20507211 max httemp 516100107
20507212 httemp 516100307
20507213 httemp 516100507
20508210 gvtemp stdfnctn 1.0
*
p2
httemp 516100207
httemp 516100407
873. 1
*ctlvar type vi pl
20508211 max httemp
20508212 httemp
20508213 httemp
20508214 httemp
20508215 httemp
20508216 httemp
20508217 httemp
20508218 httemp
*
v2 p2
820100107
820100307
820100507
820100707
820100907
820101107
820101307
820101507
httemp
httemp
httemp
httemp
httemp
httemp
httemp
820100207
820100407
820100607
820100807
820101007
820101207
820101407
**ctlvar name type factor init fc min max
20508220 rvtemp stdfnctn 1.0 873.1
*
*ctlvar type vi p1
125
v2 p2
max httemp
httemp
httemp
httemp
httemp
httemp
httemp
httemp
820100101
820100301
820100501
820100101
820100901
820101101
820101301
820101501
httemp
httemp
httemp
httemp
httemp
httemp
httemp
820100201
820100401
820100601
820100801
820101001
820101201
820101401
* compute COLLAPSE LEVEL IN WATER TANK*
**ctlvar name type factor init fc min max
20509010 PSACS sum 1.0 10. 1
*ctlvar aO al vl pl a2 v2 p2
20509011 0.0 1.00 voidf 941010000 0.40 voidf 960010000
20509012 0.40 voidf 960020000 0.40 voidf 960030000
20509013 0.40 voidf 960040000 0.40 voidf 960050000
20509014 0.40 voidf 960060000 0.40 voidf 960070000
20509015 0.40 voidf 960080000 0.40 voidf 960090000
20509016 0.40 voidf 960100000 1.00 voidf 937010000
20509017 1.00 voidf 937020000 1.00 voidf 937030000
20509018 1.00 voidf 937040000 1.00 voidf 937050000
20509019 1.00 voidf 937060000 1.00 voidf 937070000
*+ 1.00 voidf 937080000 1.00 voidf 937090000
**$
* compute COLLAPSE LEVEL IN WATER TANK*$- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
**ctlvar name type factor init fc min max
20509020 PSACS sum 1.0 10. 1
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20508221
20508222
20508223
20508224
20508225
20508226
20508227
20508228
a2 v2 p2*ctlvar a0
20509021
20509022
20509023
20509024
20509025
20509026
20509027
20509028
20509029
al vl pl
0.0 1.00 voidf
0.40 voidf
0.40 voidf
0.40 voidf
0.40 voidf
0.40 voidf
1.00 voidf
1.00 voidf
1.00 voidf
911010000
961020000
961040000
961060000
961080000
961100000
907020000
907040000
907060000
0.40 voidf 961010000
0.40 voidf 961030000
0.40 voidf 961050000
0.40 voidf 961070000
0.40 voidf 961090000
1.00 voidf 907010000
1.00 voidf 907030000
1.00 voidf 907050000
1.00 voidf 907070000
)0 voidf 9070900001.00 voidf 907080000 1.(
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* compute COLLAPSE LEVEL IN WATER TANK*
**ctlvar name type factor init fc min max
20509030 PSACS sum 1.0 10. 1
*
*ctlvar a0 al vl pl
20509031 0.0 1.00 voidf
20509032
20509033
20509034
20509035
20509036
20509037
20509038
20509039
*
0.40 voidf
0.40 voidf
0.40 voidf
0.40 voidf
0.40 voidf
1.00 voidf
1.00 voidf
1.00 voidf
a2 v2 p2
921010000 0.40 voidf 962010000
962020000
962040000
962060000
962080000
962100000
917020000
917040000
917060000
0.40 voidf
0.40 voidf
0.40 voidf
0.40 voidf
1.00 voidf
1.00 voidf
1.00 voidf
1.00 voidf
962030000
962050000
962070000
962090000
917010000
917030000
917050000
917070000
1.00 voidf 917080000 1.00 voidf 917090000
* compute COLLAPSE LEVEL IN WATER TANK*
**ctlvar name type factor init fc min max
20509040 PSACS sum 1.0 10. 1
*
*ctlvar aO al vl pl
20509041 0.0 1.00voidf
20509042
20509043
20509044
20509045
20509046
20509047
20509048
20509049
0.40 voidf
0.40 voidf
0.40 voidf
0.40 voidf
0.40 voidf
1.00 voidf
1.00 voidf
1.00 voidf
a2 v2 p2
931010000 0.40 voidf
963020000
963040000
963060000
963080000
963100000
927020000
927040000
927060000
0.40 voidf
0.40 voidf
0.40 voidf
0.40 voidf
1.00 voidf
1.00 voidf
1.00 voidf
1.00 voidf
963010000
963030000
963050000
963070000
963090000
927010000
927030000
927050000
927070000
1.00 voidf 9270900001.00 voidf 927080000
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